

Fact & Figures

Wm. McDuffie
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1789-1851

McDuffie's

SPEECH.

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In Senate, February 7 and 8, 1844—On the resolution to postpone indefinitely Mr. McDUFFIE's bill to reduce the present tariff.

MR. PRESIDENT: As one of the committee that reported this resolution, I was against it; and have heard nothing since to reconcile me to its adoption. I am for action now on the modification of the present high tariff, and for the prompt passage of the bill introduced by the senator from South Carolina, [Mr. McDUFFIE,] amended as it may and should be in some respects, if the motion to postpone does not prevail, so as to mould it into a form more acceptable to most of the great interests and great sections of the country. My object is to present some reasons why the exorbitant and partial rate of duties on imports which now exists should not be tolerated a single day longer than is required to make the change judiciously.

I shall speak to the merits of this proposition solely. I intend to treat it as a practical question—one vital to twenty millions of people—rather than an abstract theory, or affecting the welfare merely of small regions and small classes.

We have been asked to rely on facts rather than speculations. Such a course was proper; and as, in every controversy, a variety of facts is involved, appearing often different to different persons, equally honest, but not equally inquiring, or connected with the transactions, my great effort will be to throw new light on the facts which bear upon the subject. Settle some of the doubtful facts, sir, and there will be much less difficulty as to principles; for, while men and events change, principles are eternal. Looking, then, to all the real circumstances connected with the present high and unequal tariff, whether it be a measure for protection or revenue, and the following facts seem to require its amendment without delay.

In the first place, it could not have become a law, except as a temporary measure, in a great exigency. It was voted for by no one as a new experiment, which might require years of experience, in order to develop the propriety of its continuance or modification. The system involved in it had been previously tried for near a generation, and found wanting. It had been in operation till its impolicy and oppressions con-

vulsed the Union from its centre to its extremities. It had been deliberately abolished by a union of its former friends and foes; and, so far from its having now become sacred—forbidding any agitation of its character, and requiring us to wait longer for further developments of its good or evil,—the speeches of several gentlemen on its passage, prove it was intended to be amended at an early day. It passed here by a majority of only one; and, in order that the Senate may see that no mistake exists in imputing such opinions to some without whose votes here the bill must have failed, I will trouble the Senate, by reading to them an extract or two from the debates on that occasion. The distinguished senator from New York, [Mr. WRIGHT,] declared that it was *bad, and loaded with defects*. (Appendix to Globe, 953 p., for 1842.) But the only choice was between this measure and none at all, (955 p.;) and he felt obliged to act under "*the disagreeable alternative of a very bad bill, and no revenue and no collection laws*." Another member, [Mr. WILLIAMS,] then the colleague of the chairman, [Mr. EVANS,] who deprecates touching the present tariff, and enlogizes its provisions so highly, voted for it under the deliberate expression, that *the bill, as a whole, is highly objectionable*, (957 p.)—that he would not hesitate to vote against it, if any other provision could be made; but he supported it to "enable government to continue its operation, until the people shall have another opportunity of selecting agents to represent them in another Congress; and whatever is wrong in the provisions of this bill (*and there is much of it*) may then be corrected."

The senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUCHANAN] also had the candor to declare the bill to be objectionable. But the choice was, in his view, *between that or none, and financial disgrace*. "I shall accept (said he) this now, as much the least of two evils, and look forward with hope to better times for an adjustment of the tariff on a scale more consonant with all the great and various interests of the Union, without sections." (951 p.)

The President also (without whose signature the bill would not have become a law) contemplates, in his message, that a revision of it may now be proper.

But, sir, there is a higher authority than all these with gentlemen opposite, in favor of examining into the provisions of the existing tariff, and correcting

any of them, if erroneous. Mr. Clay, in a letter written last September, says concerning the tariff of 1842:

"If there be any excesses or defects in it, (of which I have not the means of judging,) they ought to be corrected." But as to the tariff of 1828, he was well acquainted with "the circumstances which gave birth" to that. "They are highly discreditable to American legislation;" and that was a "high tariff," "eminently deserving that denomination." Now, those well acquainted with the act of 1842, know it to be not only as high a tariff, in many respects, as that of 1828, but in some, higher; and if the former was on that account discreditable to American legislation, this is worse, and therefore should be at once corrected. Other circumstances connected with it were similar. It originated in importunities from only one small class in society; was partial, and unequal in its burdens for their benefits; and tended to exact tribute from the rest to sustain them alone. Did any gentleman who had not examined the details critically, deem this a mere opinion founded on loose generalities, and consider it impossible that, after the fatal effects which flowed from the high tariff of 1828, a majority of any Congress could proceed to renew several duties quite as high, and indeed much higher? Let him, then, look to the recorded facts in our own statute books, from which a tabular statement has been compiled by me, a few items in which I will take the liberty to read. [Appendix, table No. 1.]

Here are eighteen distinct articles, each of which is higher, under the present tariff, than that of 1828. Among them are the important items of cordage, cotton cloths, cotton bagging, some kinds of glass, iron, shoes and boots, with molasses, crockeryware, and woollens. If salt and sugar were at a specific rate of duty nominally less, they were burdened higher in proportion to their present value. Many of these articles were great necessities of life, whether in the log cabin or palace, or on the vessel's deck, freighted with the rich spices and silks of India, or the western keel-boat and gallant steamer, loaded with the labors of the hardy farmer across the Alleghanies; and when cordage is now taxed four and a half cents, instead of four, per pound; steel two dollars and fifty cents, instead of two dollars a hundred; shoes thirty, instead of twenty-five cents a pair; and crockeryware fifty per cent. more than the former impost,—can any one say that, if the act of 1828 was high or discreditable, or a bill of abominations, this is not higher, and more discreditable?

I will not go through all the articles where the parallel is drawn before me in the table, lest it might prove tedious. But there were weighty reasons, beside these, for an early revision of the present tariff. In its general character and design, it was framed, not for revenue, but protection, and that protection direct, and chiefly to one class of the community, which being a small one, in proportion to the whole; it thus endangered, if not sacrificed, the interests of the many, to aid a few. Whenever any of its provisions have been moulded differently to accomplish this purpose, it is a departure from sound principle, being a purpose not financial in its origin or tendency—not in conformity with the sound principles of taxation, nor permissible for

other objects under the spirit of our confederated form of government, where no such power is expressly granted; and every power not so granted is reserved to the States and the people.

I shall not, however, on this occasion, investigate the mooted question of its constitutionality, because time for such an argument does not exist, without omitting much that tends to demonstrate the propriety of amending such a bill, on great principles of justice and equality in legislation, older than all constitutions, and paramount to every technical consideration.

I proceed to offer facts to prove that the present tariff is such. It was prayed for, in many reports, and the money was taken only as to the influence of many of its provisions to aid one class. The passage of them, in their present form, was advocated as necessary for the protection of that class; and, however some other considerations as to revenue or consequential benefits to other classes may have mingled with the paramount object in giving the present extraordinary form and pressure to most of the rates of duty, yet the interest and protection of manufactures were the Alpha and Omega in the numerous departures which occur in it from the sound revenue system which existed here from the foundation of the government until the derangements of industry during the last war. Prior to that event, (as I will explain more fully hereafter,) the highest range of duties on foreign imports had never swollen above 15 per cent, with two and a half more for a time, on account of the Mediterranean fund, to raise means for humbling the piratical powers on the coast of Barbary. Those were truly revenue and not protective taxes, except that incidental protection to all classes which always results to all branches of protective industry from any impost, however small, on rival imports from abroad. But the double duties for revenue, during the war, with the increased difficulty in obtaining supplies from other countries, had given a new impulse to several domestic manufactures, and when peace arrived, those engaged in them deprecated the injury likely to flow from the large import and consumption of foreign articles similar to their own. Accordingly, to protect them, and them alone, and that but temporarily, the addition of near 42 per cent. was made to several of the duties, as before graduated, on the peace standard for revenue; and, so far from its being pretended that this addition, deliberately placed on rival productions only, was solely with a view to revenue, it was admitted and proposed to be done, directly for the purpose of protection, and that chiefly to the manufacturing interest alone. Before me is Mr. Dallas's report, in February, 1816, formally declaring that such protection was desirable, and selecting the articles which most needed it, and recommending the amounts of duty on each, which he considered likely to yield it.—[See 3 State Papers—Finance, p. 9.]

What class, after six years' trial, became dissatisfied with this amount of direct protection, and asked for and obtained more in 1824? Who again in 1828? and who again in 1842?

There is no pretence that the further increase of duty in 1824 and 1828, on the former protected articles, was demanded or imposed for the purposes of revenue. One of the supporters of the bill of 1828, now a member of this body, [Mr. WRIGHT,] frankly admitted, in July, 1842, "that the tariff of 1828 was avowedly passed for protection; and if con-

In a subsequent part of Mr. W.'s speech, he referred to one case where printed cottons, under the act of 1842, paid a hundred per cent. more than they did under the high rates of 1828 and 1824. Mr. SIMMONS expressed a wish to learn how Mr. W. made this out; and he replied, giving the details.

considerations of revenue had any connection with it, they were only incidental to the main object of protection." Appendix to *Globe*, p. 653, for 1842.

As little can it be pretended that similar provisions, asked by similar persons, and for similar objects, in 1842, were not cast into their present unequal, high, and oppressive form, for the same objects as before—the direct protection of the single class of manufacturers. I admit that we needed more revenue in 1842. But it is manifest that we could easily have obtained as much as now from a duty on foreign imports not averaging over 20 or 25 per cent.; or, if obliged to go higher in any case, under the impression, usually erroneous, that by going higher a larger aggregate amount can be obtained, it is equally manifest that we ought to have gone higher, on luxuries, rather than necessities; and on such articles as would throw the tax, according to the ability to pay, on property, rather than the person, and not make taxation doubly odious and oppressive, as is done by this tariff, through its operation almost as a poll tax, making the poor pay *per capita* nearly as much to the support of the general government as the wealthy. Such oppressive provisions were, therefore, not designed for fair fiscal purposes, but for protection to a favorite class, possessed of great enterprise and political influence, I admit, and equal rights with others; but no more moral, useful, or patriotic, than most other classes of the American people; and having a very small proportion of numbers and capital to be protected compared with the whole Union. As the mere revenue standard, in some countries, has not exceeded 10 per cent., and in others 15 or 20; and we did not exceed the latter during near a quarter of a century, I propose to show, by figures, that the present duties are, in many vital respects, far above that standard. I hold in my hand a statement of the rate now imposed on several articles above not only 20, but 30 per cent. And I am the more anxious that the Senate should note the numerous and great excesses into which the act runs, from the circumstance that some deny the high protective character of any part of the present tariff; and many who doubt it, are unable to verify their apprehensions with accuracy, because most of the duties being specific, and the cost of the articles abroad not known, the real per centage of the tax on their value is concealed and not able to be ascertained, except at the treasury.

But fortunately, in 1840, a document was obtained from the Treasury Department, which gave the cost and charges and quantities of all important articles imported in that year. Thus everybody can reduce the specific rate to one *ad valorem* for that year; and are since enabled to do the same; where the cost of the article has not materially changed. In order, however, to verify my own computations, and correct any changes in value since, I have compared my statement with one which has been obtained officially from the Treasury Department; and it is in this way rendered as accurate as is possible in the nature of things. [Table No. 2.]

What, Mr. President, do you believe has been the general result? Only four or five, or, at most, a dozen articles on which the community are taxed over the highest revenue standard of 30 per cent. No, sir; but forty-one articles. And that without including seventeen varieties of iron manufacture, and as many more of cotton. These forty-one also include most, if not all, of those great necessities of life which we import; and among them seven, which

are so burdened as to pay over fourteen and a half millions of dollars; out of twenty-one that would accrue on imports no larger than those of 1840. [Table No. 3.]

Does the Senate suppose, however, that the duty imposed in these cases merely crossed the true line of revenue a few cents or fractions, and therefore not enough to change the leading features of a revenue bill? If so, they must be surprised to learn that some descriptions of them reach 50, 80, 100, and even 150 per cent. Thus: boots and shoes pay from 50 to 75 per cent.

What was the duty, also, on coal, used largely on the seaboard by all classes, and especially in the freezing inclemencies of weather now agonizing the poor and distressed of our cities? Quite 61 per cent., (by the official computation of the department,) or more than double the highest true revenue rate. The duties on cerdage—an article of universal use, in some form or other, from the St. Croix to the Sabine, and even to Oregon—ranged from 71 to 188 per cent. Cottons—which, more or less, helped to clothe all classes—paid from 40 to 63 per cent. Woollens rose still higher. Sugar—which sweetens the cup of all—swelled to 71 and 101 per cent. Salt—which was gloriously free in that country so often sneered at by us as deeply oppressed—paid, by this tariff, near 80 per cent., and some kinds still more; while iron—one of the great instruments to vanquish the earth, as well as our enemies, and carry on our whole domestic and foreign commerce—is from 45 to 77 per cent. Indeed, the hammer and the anvil of every blacksmith's shop in every village of the Union, are loaded with some of the highest of these duties; and the oppression from them, in a thousand other forms, is carried into every kitchen and farm-yard of the whole republic.

Again, if this tariff was not intended for direct protection to manufacturers rather than for revenue, why were not its highest duties and greatest collections from luxuries and the elegances of life, rather than necessities? This is the course elsewhere. In England, for instance, tobacco is made to yield near seventeen millions of revenue yearly, and spirits about thirteen millions by customs, and near twenty-five millions more by excise—sums ranging not far from our whole income on imports. But we burden highest the prime necessities of life, and collect from sugar, iron, woollens, cottons, linens, molasses, and silks—most of them indispensable in every cottage and every degree of latitude and longitude over our wide domain—the great mass of our whole revenue on foreign merchandise.

Here is a detailed statement, computed on the latest data accessible, and showing that those articles alone probably pay more than three-fourths of the whole. (See No. 3.) I challenge any plausible reason to be assigned for this odious and oppressive discrimination, except that every one of these articles has rival productions here of a manufactured character, intended thus to be directly protected.

Should a doubt remain that the present tariff was modelled to accomplish that favorite object to manufacturers, and not to aid at the same time, by like and equal protection, the interests of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, (which is frequently pretended,) let him listen a moment to a fact or two more, which alone are sufficient to silence forever any such pretence.

What, sir! Tell the hard fisted farmer that he is equally watched over and protected by the bill, when almost every production, agricultural and

otherwise, which is the raw material for a manufacture here, is unprotected—exonerated from any but a small duty, or made entirely free; and when, at the same moment, the manufacture from that production is protected highly, and often oppressively, at the expense of the farmer who is obliged to purchase it? That the Senate may see that this offensive discrimination is not accidental, or confined to two or three cases only, and that it is not a tariff of equal protection to all, I have prepared a schedule from the acts of Congress themselves, now before me, from which it appears that, in fifteen instances at least, and as to some very leading articles, the imports of three of which alone exceed, yearly, four millions of dollars, the producer of the raw article has the protection of only one, five, and fifteen per cent. generally, while in every instance the manufacture working up the raw article, has a protection ranging from twenty-five to one hundred and thirty per cent. (See table 4.)

Thus, while the farmer gets the protection of only nine per cent. on his raw flax, the manufacturer of it into cloth obtains on that from twenty-five to fifty per cent. And while rough wool gets the aid of but twenty per cent., those who make manufactures from it, have thirty; and while cheap wool was long free and now had but five per cent protection, the farmer is obliged to go and pay for protection to the manufacturer making carpets and cloths for him from the same wool, sixty per cent. He was assisted as to his hides, (of which almost every agriculturist raised some,) but five per cent.; while the manufacture of leather from them, which the farmer was compelled to buy for his family, received thirty-five per cent. protection.

[Some senators here smiled, and said not his own hide.]

No, sir; as to that, he has been skinned so often, and so patiently, the high protectionists seem to imagine that, like the boy's eels, he will continue to bear it without complaint, because he is so used to it. No, sir, they are the hides of the herds that graze on his verdant pastures, which are thus discriminated against; and though the hemp which may grow in the fields contiguous in Maine and Vermont, as well as in Kentucky and Missouri, is better protected, and so high as to burden much the ship-builder; yet the manufacturers, using up that very hemp, obtain for their cordage and cotton bagging over a hundred, and in some cases, over two hundred per cent. more than the rate on the raw material. Again: the maker of brass kettles—an article so widely used—obtains from every purchaser the benefit of a duty of twelve cents a pound; while the raw material is imported free. The boasted protection to the silk-grower is of the same character, when, in household economy, the aged and young may economically raise cocoons and receive fifty cents a pound as a protective duty; but are obliged to pay the manufacturer on the very article made from those cocoons, and bought for their own wear, a protective duty of five times that amount, or \$2 50. The specifications might be much farther extended, did time permit; but the table itself is at the service of any gentleman who wishes to see all the cases; and there is annexed an enormous list of articles admitted entirely free for the benefit of the manufacturer, (see No. 4.) What has been the way in which the farmer was deluded to overlook this system of direct partiality against him and his great interests? It has been by keeping these unjust discriminations in the back ground, and push-

ing forward cases of agricultural productions, on which the duty was high; but which, as the chairman [Mr. EVANS,] admitted were articles so abundant here that they needed no protective duties—no, sir; no more than the ice and granite of New Hampshire. Hence, when the producer of the raw material here (as in the former cases) finds it more difficult to grow and compete with the producer abroad, he receives less aid, or none; but when he can easily and abundantly grow an article, and compete with a whole world, without artificial protection, the friends of the American system offer to him very high duties. They sternly withhold what he wants, but kindly bestow what he does not want. It is a curious circumstance, also, that the agricultural articles favored with a higher duty, are all those from which little or nothing is manufactured here, and hence the friends of the American system have no interest against their being high; nor are the duties, in this last class of cases, made high for revenue, any more than for real and needed protection. Because the aggregate imports of the whole eleven articles were, in 1840, but \$71,547, yielding a revenue of not over one-third that sum, while the aggregate imports of only three of the fifteen other articles, not protected fully or equally, were fifty-seven times larger than all of these. The tendency, then, if not the object of the duties, which are high on agricultural products, is mere show, or visionary. It has been to throw dust in the eyes of the community on this subject, and sustain one of the delusions which has misled so many farmers into the erroneous belief that their interests were, in reality, protected as much as those of the manufacturers. In order that Senators may see the particulars on which my remarks to this last point are grounded, here is a schedule of these articles, the duty on each, and the whole imports of them in 1840—some reaching only the paltry sum of seven dollars, and some nothing. (No. 5.) Now, sir, if, as a matter of fact, I have proved this bill to be shaped on a system of high discriminating duties for the direct protection of manufacturers, rather than all classes, and, in many respects, for that, and not for revenue, it follows, even if it be within the purview of any technical words used in the great charter of our liberties, that it is hostile to the spirit and the compromises which created, and which alone can sustain that charter; hostile to the equal interests and claims of great sections, classes, and industrial pursuits; hostile to the true welfare of the majority of the whole, as a whole; and hostile to their harmony and peace, as well as the perpetuity of the Union itself.

I am aware that the preamble of the act of 1790 has been cited as an evidence that the direct encouragement of manufactures was one of the objects of that act. But when the rate of duties contained in it is adverted to, (a skeleton of which he held in his hand—table No. 6,) it would be seen that none of them was higher than a moderate revenue standard. Most of them did not exceed 5 and 10 per cent.; and consequently nothing could have been intended by them beyond that incidental encouragement to manufactures which all revenue tariffs must yield, when founded on pure revenue principles. Our fathers concluded to encourage manufactures, by collecting a large portion of their revenue from imports, rather than deriving it all from direct taxes and internal duties. Indeed, their rule, like mine, was to collect, if needed, all the revenue from imports which they will yield without going higher

in the rates than a revenue standard, and what is consistent with the preservation in full vigor of our foreign commerce. But all wanted beyond that should be obtained from other sources; and, happily, our lands will usually, with that, yield sufficient for all the expenses of an economical government in time of peace. It is not inconsistent with free trade that the imports help, in a due proportion with other property, to pay the public expenses.

But when, in 1794, and 1798, and 1812, our fathers needed more revenue than could be obtained from moderate duties—no higher than a revenue standard—they resorted for the rest to taxes on land and excise. Their actions spoke louder than any words—especially when the latter are open to misconstruction—and they never deemed it proper, under the spirit of the constitution, to encourage manufactures by express prohibitions of foreign articles, or by implied prohibitions, through exorbitant imposts of a prohibitory tendency. On the contrary, in all the pressure of a heavy revolutionary debt—the large expenses of a quasi war with France—and our controversies with the Barbary powers, as well as our Indian border foes—they never, as a general rule, though needing more revenue, increased the rates of duty beyond fifteen per cent., or seventeen and a half including the Mediterranean fund. Here is the evidence of the fact, (table No. 6;) and it is conclusive proof that no such restrictive system for manufactures, like the act of 1842, was ever deemed within the true spirit and policy of the government. It is not a little curious, that, when annoyed by foreign prohibitory imposts, and with their own tonnage also comparatively small, neither Mr. Jefferson, in his able report, in 1794, on our foreign commerce, nor Mr. Madison, in his celebrated resolutions founded thereon, ever proposed any higher duties than ten or fifteen per cent., except as a mere war measure of retaliation; and that never, in fact, till war itself came, in 1812, with all its burdens and horrors, and the American protective system followed, in 1816—aggravated again, till it became, in 1823, little, if any, less burdensome and terrific than war itself—did any of the revolutionary school of statesmen think proper to impose duties higher than fair revenue ones, or which tended, except incidentally, to protect any one branch of national industry, at the expense of the rest. It is still more curious, that even Hamilton—so much relied on by the manufacturers as an advocate of their system—argues strongly, in the *Federalist*, (page 204,) that the power given in the constitution to collect taxes from other sources than imports was meant to prevent such high duties on imports alone as would yield direct encouragement to manufactures, and injure commerce and agriculture, as well as revenue, and was with a view to enable Congress, rather than do that, to keep the duties at a revenue standard, and resort for additional means, if needed, to taxes of a different character. His words are these, (*Federalist*, page 204:)

“Suppose, as has been contended for, the federal power of taxation were to be confined to the duties on imports; it is evident that the government, for want of being able to command other resources, would frequently be tempted to extend these duties to an injurious excess. There are persons who imagine that this can never be the case; since the higher they are, the more it is alleged they will tend to discourage an extravagant consumption, to produce a favorable balance of trade, and to promote domestic

manufactures. But all extremes are pernicious in various ways. Exorbitant duties on imported articles serve to beget a general spirit of smuggling, which is always prejudicial to the fair trader, and eventually to the revenue itself; they tend to render other classes of the community tributary, in an improper degree, to the manufacturing classes, to whom they give a premature monopoly of the markets: they sometimes force industry out of its most natural channels into others in which it flows with less advantages; and, in the last place, they oppress the merchant, &c., &c.”

This is noble and manly reasoning—considering it comes from one so often quoted as favoring the American system—and is worthy to be written in letters of gold for the perusal of all its indiscreet friends.

Again: who of his school—who then ever dared to propose absolute prohibitions of foreign rival commodities, as is done in the absolute governments of Europe, and under the powers of the English and French governments, so much more unlimited than ours? Yet what is the difference in principle—in political substance and in morals—between a direct prohibition and one incident by prohibitory duties?

And now when old reasons for retaliation have mostly become obsolete—the reasons of infancy in the growth of manufactures, so as to need direct aid, ceased, we are driven into a prohibitory system more ultra than was ever before attempted in the worst time. Is this anomaly opposed now, or was it, in practice, opposed before 1816, because the friends of free trade then or now resist protection? No. They favor protection to the persons and property of all; that is equal protection—equal justice. But what has astonished me most is, that in this debate, as well as elsewhere, attempts have been made to make the restrictive system lean on Franklin's staff for support; when, from early life, I had always supposed that the opinions of Franklin on free trade were decidedly of the Colbert and Adam Smith school; and that, so far from the free trade notions having originated, since his day, here, and being likely, in the views of the chairman, [Mr. EVANS,] not to survive their authors, I thought they had lived already much beyond their authors abroad; and, as becoming better understood, were making converts on both continents, among the ablest minds, as well as the great masses of society. In order to see how the real truth was on this controverted point concerning Franklin, and the conclusions to which his great experience and unrivalled sagacity had reached on this subject, I have taken some pains to run through portions of his works, and without giving much that is pertinent will trouble the Senate with a few extracts from them.

In volume 6, p. 157, he says:

“We see much in parliamentary proceedings, and in papers and pamphlets, of the injury the concessions to Ireland will do to the *manufacturers of England*, while the *people of England* seem to be forgotten, as if quite out of the question. If the *Irish can manufacture cottons, and stuffs, and silks, and linens, and cutlery, and toys, and books, &c., &c., &c.*, so as to sell them cheaper in England than the *manufacturers of England* sell them, is not this good for the *people of England* who are not manufacturers? And will not even the manufacturers themselves share the benefit? Since, if cottons are cheaper, all the other manufacturers who wear cottons will save in that article; and so with the rest.”

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"I am not enough master of the course of our commerce to give an opinion on this particular question; and it does not behoove me to do it; yet I have seen so much embarrassment and so little advantage in all the restraining and compulsive systems, that I feel myself strongly inclined to believe that a State, which leaves all her ports open to all the world upon equal terms, will by that means have foreign commodities cheaper, and sell its own productions dearer, and be on the whole most prosperous."

Volume 4, p. 170:

"Perhaps, in general, it would be better if government meddled no farther with trade than to protect it, and let it take its course. Most of the statutes or acts, edicts, arrears, and placards of Parliament, Princes, and States, for regulating, directing, or restraining of trade, have, we think, been either political blunders, or jobs obtained by artful men for private advantage, under pretence of public good. When Colbert assembled some wise old merchants of France, and desired their advice and opinion how he could best serve and promote commerce; their answer, after consultation, was in three words only—'*Laissez nous faire.*' Let us alone. It is said by a very solid writer of the same edition, that he is well advanced in the science of politics, who knows the full force of that maxim—'*Pas trop gouverner*'—not to govern too much; which, perhaps, would be of more use when applied to trade, than in any other public concern. It were therefore to be wished that commerce was as free between all nations of the world, as it is between the several counties of England: so would all, by mutual communication, obtain more enjoyments."

As to this article just quoted, Mr. Whately drew up most of it, and Franklin revised and approved it, and it is published in his works.

Again, in an essay entirely his own, (vol. 5, p. 417 and 418,) he says:

"Several of the princes of Europe have of late, from an opinion of advantage to arise by producing all commodities and manufactures within their own dominions, so as to diminish or render useless their importations, endeavored to cut off workmen from other countries, by high salaries, privileges, &c. Many persons, pretending to be skilled in various great manufactures, imagining that America must be in want of them, and that the Congress would probably be disposed to imitate the princes above mentioned, have proposed to go over, on condition of having their passage paid, lands given, salaries appointed, exclusive privileges for terms of years, &c. Such persons, on reading the articles of confederation, will find that the Congress have no power committed to them, nor money put into their hands for such purposes; and that if any such encouragement is given, it must be by the government of some separate State. This, however, has rarely been done in America; and when it has been done, it has rarely succeeded, so as to establish a manufacture, which the country was not so ripe for as to encourage private persons to set it up—labor being generally too dear there, and hands difficult to be kept together, every one desiring to be a master, and the cheapness of land inclining many to leave trades for agriculture. Some, indeed, have met with success, and are carried on to advantage; but they are generally such as require only a few hands, or wherein great part of the work is performed by machines. Goods that are bulky, and of so small value as not well to

bear the expense of freight, may often be made cheaper in the country than they can be imported; and the manufacture of such goods will be profitable wherever there is sufficient demand. The farmers in America produce, indeed, a good deal of wool and flax; and none is exported, it is all worked up; but it is in the way of domestic manufacture. The buying up quantities of wool and flax, with the design to employ spinners, weavers, &c., and form great establishments, producing quantities of linen and woollen goods for sale, has been several times attempted in different provinces; but those projects have generally failed, goods of equal value being imported cheaper. And when the governments have been solicited to support such schemes by encouragements in money, or by imposing duties on importation of such goods, it has been generally refused, on this principle, that if the country is ripe for the manufacture, it may be carried on by private persons to advantage; and if not, it is a folly to think of forcing nature.

"Great establishments of manufacture require great numbers of poor to do the work for small wages; those poor are to be found in Europe; but will not be found in America till the lands are all taken up and cultivated, and the excess of people who cannot get land want employment. The manufacture of silk, they say, is as natural in France as that of cloth in England, because each country produces in plenty the first material; but if England will have a manufacture of silk as well as that of cloth, and France of cloth as well as that of silk, these unnatural operations must be supported by mutual prohibitions, or high duties on the importation of each other's goods; by which means the workmen are enabled to tax the home consumer by greater prices, while the higher wages they receive makes them neither happier nor richer, since they only drink more and work less. Therefore, the governments in America do nothing to encourage such projects."

But enough of this to remove doubts in the most incredulous. Having shown that the present tariff was framed for the real protection of only one class, and that this was contrary to the spirit of the constitution, and every principle of equal justice in taxation or protection, as well as contrary to the whole practice of the government for the first quarter century of its existence; and when resorted to since, had created intense excitement, and wide dissatisfaction, till after a few years the Union became convulsed, and the system was abandoned,—I will next ask a few moment's attention to its character as a system—not for protection, but for raising revenue.

The senator from Maine seemed to consider it a good bill as a revenue act.

[Mr. EVANS observed that, in answering the senator from South Carolina, (who maintained that the act of 1842 was destructive to revenue,) he had shown it increased revenue, but did not say it was exclusively an act for revenue.]

Very well, sir, I am happy to hear the gentleman admit that he does not defend the tariff as exclusively an act for revenue. This virtually concedes my former position, that it is, in many respects, a measure for protection. It is one of the peculiarities of this measure, that among manufacturers it is justified as an act for their protection; but in quarters averse to the protective system; it is vindicated as a mere revenue measure; and in a mixed audience, it is defended as being intended for

both—a little for each. If the argument anywhere presses hardest against its protective features, then it is insisted that no change shall be made, as it is excellent for revenue; and if hardest against its revenue character, then it is said to do so much good for protection, it must not be amended, or even discussed; and if it is unable to stand alone on either hypothesis, then the argument has been, as from the chairman, [MR. EVANS,] that whatever inequality, injustice, imperfection, or wrong of any kind, is connected with it, is made reparation for by the aid it gives in *reducing prices, furnishing home markets, employing more American industry, and less foreign pauper labor*; and in various ways more than remunerating the country as a whole for any evils it may happen to inflict on some of its parts.

Now, sir, let us test these matters on facts, and not broad assertions. Is it good as a revenue measure? and, if not, what is the extent of the evils it inflicts, whether as a protective or financial system? and are those evils compensated by any of the benefits that have resulted or are likely to flow from it, if we forbear to amend it?

Several remarks have already been made indicating my views as to some of its objectionable features as a bill for raising revenue. What are the true elements and features of a mere revenue bill? In the first place, the leading object of a revenue bill is to obtain revenue equally; of this, unequally. A tax should be made to bear lightly as possible on consumers; this is to bear most heavily on them. The particular duties in numerous instances range 10, 20, and even 40 and 50 per cent. higher than the common revenue standard. I do not pretend that, like the dew point or freezing point, the financial scale can be mathematically marked, beyond which no duties should rise on any occasion or under any circumstances. But I do insist that few nations, ancient or modern, have ever deemed it proper for revenue to exceed 20 or 25 per cent. The accustomed rate for that purpose has often (as here, from 1790 to 1812) been under 20 than above it; and when exceeding it, as sometimes in England, France, and Spain, and here since 1816, has usually been done avowedly for purposes of protection, and not revenue. It is now, in Prussia and Germany, no less than Switzerland, seldom as high as 20 per cent. Hence the compromise act of 1833 provided for a gradual reduction of our protective duties to revenue ones, and fixed them at a maximum of 20 per cent. And hence both General Harrison and Mr. Clay, in addresses before the election of 1840, expressed their satisfaction with the compromise, limiting imposts to that rate; because that rate not only would be likely to furnish revenue enough, with the public lands, for an economical administration of the government, but, coupled as it was with cash duties and a home valuation, would incidentally afford a large and equal protection against foreigners, to all the producing classes, and an ample one for any business, which it would be profitable for the country, in its present position, to have prosecuted here.

Do I any infer from this that I oppose the collection, in a proper way, of revenue enough in time of peace to prevent running in debt (as we lately have done) twenty-seven millions? or, however anxious to relieve labor and the necessities of life, to defray all honest debts rather than resort to an odious evasion by *repudiation*? or to sustain in due vigor all the useful establishments of the country, with public credit, public faith, and public honor? Far, far

from it. But collect it on revenue principles, and in a true revenue way.

In the next place, the present tariff is bad as a revenue measure, by attempting to collect more from the owners and consumers of foreign imports than an equal or proportionate burden on that kind of property. Being often 60 to 100 per cent. in particular cases, and 37 per cent. on an average, it is much higher than taxes on other property in society, looking either to value or income. And, though, under our double systems of government, I do not contend that all the revenue for the general government may not be collected from imports, if it does not put them above 20 or 25 per cent.—leaving lands and other property to be taxed by the States—yet imports should pay only a fair proportion. It is another objection to this bill, as a fiscal one, that if we are to receive under it all the revenue its friends anticipate—we shall collect a larger proportion of the moneyed taxes of the whole country, from customs, than it is usual to collect in most other governments. In France, only about thirty millions of dollars (or $\frac{1}{4}$ th of their whole income), is collected from customs—over one hundred and eighty millions being from other sources; while in England, little over a third of the whole taxes come from customs, and including tithes and the poor rates, probably not one-third. But here, at least half of the whole would be derived from customs—as all our moneyed taxes in the States are not computed to average over one dollar per head, or eighteen to twenty millions of dollars in the aggregate. If you will then push our national expenses so high as not to be able to get sufficient revenue at a rate of twenty or twenty-five per cent, I say it is sound political economy to go for the rest to the other sources of revenue, which the constitution has conferred, and for that very purpose, and to act, in this respect, as our fathers were wont to do in 1794, 1796, and 1812.

But other and paramount objections to the present tariff is, that it taxes articles of trade so high as to tend to break up trade itself; that it taxes necessities higher than luxuries—as before explained that it taxes the person in its operation, rather than property or ability to pay; and in many cases, by one specific duty, collects from the consumer, in middling or indigent circumstances, as large a tax on a coarser and cheaper fabric—such as shoes, flannels, &c. worn by them—as on a finer and more costly one of the same name, worn by the rich. The only effectual mode of preventing partiality and oppression in such bills is to fix a liberal maximum of twenty or twenty-five per cent. Within that, the duty may well fluctuate rather than be rigidly horizontal, if revenue objects require and admit it; so as to relieve necessities some, if practicable, and favor the needy rather than wealthy, and graduate most, if not all, duties on a scale *ad valorem*—so that the people can know the true extent of their burdens, and each pay only in proportion to the value of what he consumes.

To illustrate the tendency of varying the amount of duty on particular articles beyond a certain ordinary and settled standard for mere revenue, and on revenue principles, do not gentlemen see, that if you can depart from that, and go far above it for protection to one class (such as the manufacturers) at the expense of others, (the farmers,) you may, as in England, by the odious corn laws, depart from it for the benefit of the land owners, and at the expense of the manufacturers?

If such enormous high duties as disfigure the present tariff can be imposed on particular articles even for revenue, much less protection, do not all see that a door is also opened to equal if not greater injustice another way? Cannot a few articles be thus selected for revenue, and others left free, or at a low rate, where the articles selected are consumed chiefly but in one section of the country, or by one class of the community; and when those being necessities are not able to be dispensed with?—and thus a dominant party or section force most of the public burdens on their opponents? This is not to be tolerated a moment, even for revenue, on any sound principles of taxation.

Again: as a revenue measure, it had not yet been able to meet the wants of the government. Deficiencies had already occurred, and been supplied by loans in a period of profound peace; and the proper official organ of the government informs us, in his annual report, that more deficiencies are likely to occur, both in this and the ensuing year. Whether the Secretary of the Treasury was correct or not in his estimates, (and I know, from experience, there is no little difficulty, in periods of fluctuation, in forming accurate opinions as to the future,) it was safer for us to take, in the main, the official data. Certainly the tariff had not yet yielded so much, by five millions, the last year, as some of its friends estimated in 1842; and if the large returns from New York for January were hastily looked to as a guide for the whole year, the aggregate revenue from customs would, in 1844, exceed forty millions of dollars—exceeding the previous estimates of the chairman near twenty millions.

[Mr. EVANS said he disclaimed considering them a guide for the whole year.]

I think it will be prudent not to consider them so, or we must anticipate another ruinous revulsion, ere long. Besides all this, the revenue in different quarters has already so fluctuated under this bill, as to vary a million or more, sometimes lower and sometimes higher in each, ever since its passage, and precludes any reliance on its steady operation. It is a mistake, too, that raising the duties so high as these are for protection, is likely to raise much higher the aggregate of revenue than it would be if none exceeded thirty per cent., when we look to its tendency to check and reduce importations, and to encourage smuggling. Their increase during the last few months, has arisen from the impulses given to the commerce of the world by opening new markets, and the low rate of interest for capital to embark in new enterprises, rather than from any benefits to the revenue or business generally, by so high a tariff.

At the very moment while we are deliberating, the returns of the receipts from customs in England the last quarter, also show a considerable rise; and of the last year, if deducting the revenue on corn accidentally high in 1842, a larger rise still. But these results have happened there after a reduction of the rate of many duties, leading to a larger consumption, showing the reverse of what is argued as the cause here. But, in truth, the opening of new markets in Asia, among three or four hundred millions of people, or near half of the whole human race, has done much more, both in Europe and America, to revive business and increase revenue, than any changes in duties, though the reduction of them in England has tended to increase, both consumption and revenue. There had been very striking illustrations, in the case of teas and spirits, of

an increase of revenue in the aggregate, after a reduction in the rate of duties. (See several instances in Porter's View.) I will not detain the Senate by specifying but one, in the case of coffee, which, in England, on a duty of 50 per cent. less in 1840 than in 1824, had become so much more imported and consumed, as to yield more than double the amount of revenue. The rise in revenue supposed to have taken place here in a series of years after the increased rate of duties in 1816, and in consequence of it, is another error into which the senator from Maine has fallen; I presume inadvertently; for the truth is just the reverse, and is a strong proof that a protective tariff like ours tends often to reduce the aggregate.

Thus the net revenue from customs in 1817 was about twenty-six millions and a quarter—which, on the credit system then in force, had accrued chiefly on the imposts and tariff in force in 1816. Now, so far from its rising above that sum under the higher duties of 1816, or the still higher of 1824, or even of 1828, it had, in 1818, fallen to about seventeen millions; and had never again equalled twenty-six millions till 1832; and then had become larger, not by means of more natural business and of higher duties, but by much larger imports, artificially swollen, to bring home the proceeds of State loans abroad.

[MESSRS. EVANS and HUNTINGTON asked from what source Mr. W. derived his data as to the duties, since the documents appended to the last report of the Secretary of the Treasury did not give like amounts.]

I quote from the official receipts and expenditures, published in 1842, page 242; and, if the two differ in some details, they both agree in the general results I have stated. And as to the increase of imports, and consequently revenue, by means of the State debts, Mr. Gallatin and others had computed that, during eight or ten years, after adding seven and a half millions annually for profits, freights, &c., on the exports, the aggregate of imports, over and above that, had been near one hundred and thirty millions, or the estimated amount of State loans effected abroad within that period. If we looked to naked figures, without examining into causes, and extending research over several years, we were likely to be constantly misled; but, looking to causes, all became consistent and reconcileable with sound principles.

For these reasons, without specifying others, the present tariff is exceedingly defective in its character as a revenue measure, and ought to be amended. But there are other and more particular reasons against its operations on the community—whether regarded as directly protective or fiscal—which require its whole form and substance to be modified, and for which it contains no redeeming qualities sufficient to reconcile us to its continuance.

It is so framed as, in fact, to impose a heavy burden on large classes and sections of the country, and thus to operate in favor of small classes and sections, rather than for the treasury, or the whole people, as a whole.

Let us look to the evidence of this. Its average rate of duties was so near 40 per cent., that, for convenience in computation, that rate might be used. Now, sir, calculating that under it we import and consume only thirty millions of foreign merchandise, similar to what is manufactured here, the tax on that would be twelve millions of dollars; whereas a revenue duty on it of 20 per cent., for the benefit of

the treasury, would amount to only six millions; and the other six are paid for the benefit and protection of the domestic rival manufactures.

In the next place, as this tax of forty per cent. usually enhances the price of the articles to that extent, these similar domestic manufactures are raised also in price in a like proportion. This must be the case, or a higher tariff would be of no use to the makers of those articles. Now, those similar domestic manufactures, made and consumed in this country, equal in value annually about two hundred millions of dollars. Forty per cent. on that is eighty millions; but as half of it would be gained by an incidental and necessary, equal and proper protection from a 20 per cent. revenue tariff, the only addition to the public burdens, by the partial and high discriminations, is forty millions—making, with the other six, about forty-six millions paid yearly to the benefit of the manufacturing classes. As those classes constitute only one-eleventh of our whole population, ten-elevenths of the sum is paid by other classes for the benefit of merely that one-eleventh. This is a monstrous burden imposed on the others, higher than all their other taxes, both to the State and general governments, without computing profits on it by wholesale dealers and retailers. If this money was carried out of the country yearly, that circumstance would much impoverish it; but being only a tribute on some here for the benefit of others here, the money remains within our limits, but still it is deliberately fleeced from some and transferred to others.

If those others, in such favorite occupations, do not thereby grow so wealthy and powerful as some suppose, it is not for the want of protection enough, but, as will hereafter be explained, from the fluctuations in their business, caused by these same high profits, and the frequent changes in machinery, and the losses by abortive experiments, or the want of skill in the management, by some persons and in some places, comparatively inexperienced.

Now, could such a system, so unequal and anti-republican as this, and so oppressive to ten-elevenths of the people, stand a single hour if the facts were accurately understood? No, sir, no. But the fallacy is widely circulated, that the increased duty, rather than enhancing the price of articles, reduces it; and when that paradox does not gain full faith from its contradictions to experience and common sense, as well as theoretical reason, it is urged that the apparent beneficiaries of the tax are not alone aggrandized by it; but the whole country made more prosperous, and better able to pay enhanced duties and prices.

Let us scrutinize this delusion a little. That higher duties make prices lower, is, in the philosophy of the American system, the elephant on which stands their whole globe. It is entirely a discovery, not to say invention of its supporters. Abroad, the idea is deemed preposterous. It is a matter of course in general principles; and Adam Smith, Ricardo, Huskisson, McCulloch, Tooke, and many others, make their calculations, that an enhanced duty augments the price just as naturally as that higher rents, or wages, or interest, tend to make an article cost more; just as naturally as more fuel added increases the fire—more rain raises the streams.

Franklin, in this country, as we have already seen, says that high duties on the importation enables the manufacturer to tax the home consumer by greater prices. He could draw lightning from the clouds, but he could, with all his ingenuity and

skill, draw no other conclusion than this from high duties. It may be sometimes true, as an exception, that in a glut of the market the importer may not be able to sell at an enhanced price, and must then sell at a loss, if at all. Every one can see, however, that this is only temporary and occasional. For a new high duty, which, as the senator from Maine supposes, may at first raise prices, and thus check sales, will, if they afterwards fall, from the market being overstocked, bring them at once up again as soon as the supply is less and the manufacture less, as is usual after such a glut. This brief fall in price, too, whenever it happens, will, for a like reason, cause a corresponding fall in the price of the agricultural production to be exchanged for the manufacture; and, in that case, it will require no prophet to foresee that such a fall injures, in its consequences, rather than benefits the producer. The action of everybody in daily life contradicts the whole position on the other side, that, as a general principle, prices are permanently reduced by higher duties; or why do persons, after high duties, smuggle? If they make the prices here lower, the smuggling would be the other way. Why, also, are our tables loaded with memorials asking for drawbacks or to remit duties on railroad iron, if they make its price lower? Why do nations ever retaliate against others by imposing higher duties, if it makes their articles lower, and hence more in demand for consumption? Indeed, why do the manufacturers themselves ask for higher duties on the manufactured articles, if the price is not thereby increased? And why ask for low duties, or entire freedom to the raw material, if it be not thereby made lower? (See table No. 4.) And why oppose a reduction, as now, if that reduction would not tend to reduce prices? What, sir! have we not the resolution of the high-tariff legislature of Vermont, just offered here, to continue the present high duties on wool? And why is this, except that, in their opinion, frankly admitted, the price of that great staple with them has been thereby enhanced? The whole misconception, beyond the slight temporary exceptions before alluded to, appeared to arise from what undoubtedly was a fact in this country, that most manufactured articles had fallen throughout the world since high duties had begun to be imposed, in 1816. But, in the first place, a fall in many of these commenced before 1816; in the next place, every sequence was not a consequence; everything after an event did not happen on account of it, or we might attribute this fall to the war of 1812, or the great eclipse of 1806, as the fall had occurred after both. In cases like these, we must probe to the bottom and eviscerate the true causes and consequences of events, and not virtually take up the irrational, if not absurd idea, that high national taxes of any kind are a blessing, any more than that a great national debt is a national blessing.

It was, on some accounts, perhaps, unfortunate that this notion had not been discovered earlier, when our fathers considered themselves so much oppressed by a higher tax on tea, and when the French so grievously complained and rebelled against the *gabelle*, or high salt tax—none of them being so long sighted then as to dream that the prices were thereby reduced. But seriously, Mr. President, if any still doubt on this subject, let them look a little into the cautious and well-considered work on prices, which I hold in my hand, by Tooke, (edition of 1838,) not swollen with loose theories, but facts—recorded and authentic facts—giving the history and causes

of the fluctuations in prices in England during the last half century. It never entered his imagination, because they rose generally from 1795 to 1815, and fell generally from 1815 to 1842, that this proceeded at all from lower duties in the first period, or higher ones in the second. The fact as to duties was in most cases directly the reverse. No, sir, the true and general causes of a fall in prices are, first, a greater quantity of the article produced, without a greater demand; whether produced in agriculture by more fertile seasons, better manures or tools; or in manufactures by improved machinery, with chemical discoveries; or in both, by more hands released from war and other unproductive employments, and devoted to either of those pursuits. And secondly, by a contraction of the amount of the currency, whether paper or specie, by which the price is measured. While a rise happens by the reverse of these, or an addition to the tax or expense in making the articles, or the opening of new and better markets. Hence, if a fall occurs from one of the first causes, it would be still greater if none of the last intervene to counteract it in any degree—such as a higher duty, an expansion in the currency, or a new market. But these last may, and do in some cases, not counteract it entirely; and then the cry is, that the higher duty lowers the price, when in fact the other causes exist and lower it; and would make it lower still, but for the higher duty.

How unphilosophical it is, likewise, when good, pertinent, and long-established causes exist to lower prices, to hunt for another cause, not certain or rational, and conjure that up as the true one.

But enough on the reasoning connected with this fallacy, so wide, and so pervading the ranks of the friends to high protection, and which, if removed, the whole fabric must totter to its base. How are the recorded facts no less than the reasoning? Not a single case here and there, and for a month or a year; but how, on both continents, and for a long series of years, and as to numerous articles? I have before me various schedules of prices current, both in England and America. They all show conclusively that since 1795, from the causes first named, agricultural products in England have generally risen, though the highest duties have been imposed there for their protection—they, rather than manufactures, being there the pets or favorites for protection with the great landed gentry and aristocracy, that fill the two Houses of Parliament. At the same time, they show that, from the first named causes, and especially improvements in machinery and in chemistry, manufactures have fallen in price—and this when the duty was low, as well as when high. (See tables 7 and 8.)

Indeed, the difference between the official and real valuation of exports there, which indicates on the public and authentic records the changes in price since 1690, shows that the whole, from various causes, have fallen in the aggregate something like 58 per cent. The writer before me says:

"We have taken out of the list of experts the leading articles of agricultural produce for three years, (1840, 1841, 1842,) the value of which we find would have been, in 1694, (one hundred and fifty years ago,) £1,557,993; but which have now increased to a value of £3,778,321, being an advance in price of 143 per cent.

"We have also taken out some of the leading articles of manufactures for the same time, the value of which we find would have been, in 1694, £267,636,717; but which are now reduced to a value of

£107,173,382, being a reduction of price of 60 per cent. Thus showing that, while manufactured goods and minerals have fallen considerably more than a half, agricultural produce has much more than doubled its value.

"Butter and cheese have risen in price, during that period, 193 per cent.

"Corn, flour, &c. have risen 161 per cent.

"Cows have risen in price 209 per cent.

"Horses have risen in price 267 per cent.

"Wool has risen in price 169 per cent.

"While cotton manufactures have fallen in price, during that period, 73 per cent.

"Coals have fallen in price 60 per cent.

"Iron and steel have fallen in price 45 per cent.

"Linen manufactures have fallen in price 36 per cent.

"And, what is very curious, while wool has risen 169 per cent., woollen manufactures have fallen 10 per cent. in price."—*Economist*, Nov. 4, 1843.

In the United States, prices current in Boston and New York, for a long series of years, as to numerous articles, have likewise been examined. They show a general fall in price here of agricultural articles, not prevented entirely even under an expanded currency in 1814 and 1836. But this fall has occurred from great and cheap production, on our cheap, and fertile, and extensive soil; and could not happen from high protective duties, they having been low on such agricultural products as are much imported, or entirely free on several of them.

These tables showed, further, a fall in some manufactured articles where the duties ranged high, and in others where low. But this fall manifestly happened from improvements in machinery and steam, (the great and distinguishing features of the age,) or from new mines opened; and in spite of high duties rather than being their consequences. Think you, sir, that a minimum duty on cottons here has caused the fall in their price in both Europe and America, rather than the inventions of Arkwright in spinning, or Cartwright in weaving, or Watts in steam—any more than the duty here on the raw material has caused its fall two-thirds, rather than the wonderful cotton gin of Whitney, and our exuberant soil? The tables compiled from McCulloch, Tooke, and the prices current in New York, are at the service of any senator. (Nos. 7, 8 to 11.) I shall not repeat their details; but merely state, as most striking refutations of the theory on the other side, that in England, the manufactured article of salt-petre has fallen more than most others, viz: from 135 shillings per hundred weight in 1795, to 21 shillings in 1838, though on a low duty; and log-wood from 11 shillings per ton to 7, though free; and salt from 6 shillings, and during war 19 shillings, to only 1 shilling and 3 pence, in 1838, though then entirely free. The first was manifestly caused by improvements in chemistry, and new discoveries; and the two last, as in this country, from new and greater supplies combined with lower duties there, and in spite of high ones here on the great condiment of life.

The tables in 2d Tooke, 390 p., (edition 1838,) show further that the price of timber has risen under a rising duty, and tobacco not risen nor fallen, though taxed with a duty computed by the chairman at 2,000 per cent. One would suppose the last high enough, on his theory, to make the price fall next to nothing.

Here plaster of Paris, though free, and not a manufacture, has fallen as much or more than others,

vis: from \$20 per ton in 1811 to only \$2 25 in 1844; and, of course, from other causes than high duties. Indeed, out of two hundred and sixteen articles on which prices had fallen, some years since—as large a number were ascertained by the late inquisitive Condé Raguet to be such as were free or on a low duty, as on a high—thus indicating, with unerring certainty, the great and general operation of other causes. All can remember how the price of sugar fell a few years ago here under a falling duty, and how it has risen again like the Vermont wool, and cordage, and cottons, under a higher duty. Not that all articles are falling or rising in all cases, entirely from the change in duty, but always higher than they otherwise would be if a duty exists, and lower than they otherwise would be if one does not exist. Indeed, the great advocate of the protective system (Mr. Clay) at last virtually conceded away this whole ground in 1832, by expressing a willingness to reduce several of the high duties so as to relieve the consumption of the country; but which could not be thus relieved unless high duties had made prices higher—proving, in these ways, the position that prices of articles are usually made higher to the extent of the duty. It then follows that the consumer of such articles is usually obliged to pay as much more for them on that account. Such is the plain common sense of the case. Such is the doctrine of all the leading economists abroad, as well as of Franklin; and even Hamilton was forced to admit that this was oftenest the case, and when not so, the increase fell on the merchant, and was still more ruinous to him. (See *Federalist* before cited.) Mr. Dallas entertained a like idea. (See report, February, 1816. And it can never fall on the foreign producer any longer than to affect his present stock in a few cases, till he reduces his production, and thus prevents a glut.

It then follows that, as a general principle, the enhanced price of the foreign article, and also of the domestic article, is paid by the consumer. This, we have already shown, equals here now, beyond a fair revenue, about forty-three millions of dollars yearly; and as the manufacturers constitute but one-eleventh of the whole, ten-elevenths of it is paid by other consumers, and for the benefit of that one-eleventh. As most of these others belong to the agricultural classes, they being near three-fourths of all our population, the great mass of this enormous burden is thrown on them, and must induce them in time, as the real facts are well understood, to demolish the whole system of partial protection, and require, as some of us do now, that a tariff for such protection be corrected, without unnecessary delay. What does it amount to per head yearly, including their families? Over two dollars to each man, woman and child, on an average. What, in the gross, are the present duties on a few separate articles of great, vital, and universal necessity? On iron, at 25lbs. per head, it is 500,000,000lbs. for our whole population, now twenty millions of people; and the tax on this, at only three cents per pound, is fifteen millions of dollars, ten-elevenths of which is paid by others than the manufacturers. On sugar, at 14 pounds per head, at 2½ cents duty per pound, the tax is seven millions of dollars more; and on salt alone, without going into other articles, it is, at a bushel per head, quite a million and a half of dollars.

As an illustration how this presses on my own State, with a population of about 300,000, and the large mass of them farmers, the tax for iron alone

equals \$225,000, or four times the amount of the whole State tax; on sugar \$109,000 more; and on salt \$24,000—making, on only three articles, an aggregate of more than a third of a million, and near seven times the whole of what is technically our State tax. None of our population get relieved from this, except the few who make of these articles as much as they consume. All can see, in a moment, how this prevents the consumer from being able to buy, or enjoy, or lay up so much, with the same money and means, as he otherwise could; for, by the rise of price, he gets but three or four pounds of iron, sugar, &c., for the same money or value of produce, where before he got five, the cost of the difference going to the manufacturer and the revenue. The whole Union, as consumers, and, so far as not makers of such articles, feel the discriminating oppression, and are thus, in the North as well as the South, the East and the Middle States, as well as the giant West, all suffering under its unequal bearing by means of the present tariff.

But look at another aspect of the inquiry, as affecting the producing classes. The producer is usually a farmer, or planter, or manufacturer though those connected with the last class are only about a million and a half to twelve millions and three-fourths connected with the two former. Now, if the producer has to pay forty per cent more on many indispensable articles which he consumes, it will soon be manifest that, unless a manufacturer, and thus indemnified, he suffers doubly under this system, and especially as compared with any other consumer.

I shall not now enter into any technical reasoning about what is called the *forty-bale theory*; though it would be troublesome to defeat by argument the cogent reasoning of the senator before me, [Mr. McDuffie.] But this much is demonstrable, that such producers are first burdened and injured by the higher price of what they consume. Whether they purchase it here with money, or bring it home in exchange for what they produce and send abroad, the consequence is the same, that they get less in amount for consumption; and when it is argued that, in such a case, they had better not use foreign articles so raised in price, but bring home money, pray what is to be done with the money?—not eaten nor worn, but some of it exchanged here or necessities or luxuries; and, whether of domestic or foreign manufacture, enhanced in price so that he cannot procure or enjoy so many of them. It is this excessive *taxation*, in all possible ways, on the producer in England, that tempts Parliament to continue the corn-law duties, with a view to remunerate the agriculturist, by higher prices, thus caused, for his great staples. And yet, after all that, having, (as he has almost,) a monopoly of food, he grinds the laborer into riots and incendiarism; while the manufacturer, not so much the pet there, works so near the minimum price necessary to sustain life, that a bad harvest, and rise in food, or a rise in cotton, and a glut of markets, so as to diminish manufacturing, throws millions upon public charity for their daily bread. Much of those trying evils arise from excessive taxation, in various ways, and especially high duties on corn—some bearing on one kind of produce, and some on another, and all fall there on the humiliated laborer, whether engaged in manufacture or agriculture. The relief there, as well as here, is the great problem; and it is to be found in reducing, and not raising, taxation; and furnishing both bread and clothing, as well as all other mate-

rials, each from the places where they can, in the present state of society, and without forced means, be made cheapest. Then, God's bounties in every climate and stage of improvement in society, will, by commerce, become interchanged and universally diffused; and the whole human family be blessed, rather than oppressed, by each other's advantages and excellences.

Proceed, then, and lower the highest duties here, and the revenue would still be sufficient; and, other things remaining unchanged, the laborer, as well as producer, will be able to consume not only as much more as the difference of duty would buy, but industry and the prices of his own products will be so increased to the producer that he will be able to buy much more. A most memorable instance of a change in this respect occurred in the case of coffee in England, of which, under a high duty of 2s. 6d. per lb., in 1824, when foreign, and 1s. when colonial, but 8,262,943 lbs. were consumed. But the duties being then reduced one-half, the consumption, from that and other causes, increased, by 1840, to 28,664,336 lbs. [Mr. EVANS here asked if England produced any coffee; to which Mr. WOODBURY replied, that she produced some in her colonies, as well as sugar.] It is a remarkable fact, that, the duties remaining high during that same period on sugar, the consumption of it fell off 377,302 cwt.

Producers are next suffering by not being able, under high duties, to purchase lands and stock, and hire labor to the extent they otherwise might, in order to increase the quantity of their produce. It is also certain, that, under this system, produce is likely to sell for less, because their markets abroad are exposed to be cut off and diminished much more than under a system of low duties and liberal reciprocity.

Thus it is that the great agricultural producers in the South and West feel so deeply the evils of this system, having little or no remuneration for them, or relief from them, as the manufacturers themselves have, and in some respects in the North, part of those living in their immediate neighborhoods. And if it were not for the low price of lands in this country, and their virgin richness, and blessed fertility, the distress and prostration would, in past years with farmers have been much severer.

Next their markets are thus exposed to become cramped or deteriorated, under retaliations; and the great principle of trade is acknowledged now by most people, as laid down by Franklin, that commerce must, in order to flourish durably, consist of mutual exchanges. Writing to a French gentleman, he says: (vol. 5, p. 369)

"We are much pleased with the disposition of your government to favor our commerce, manifested in the late *réglement*. You appear to be possessed of a truth which few governments are possessed of—that A must take some of B's produce; otherwise B will not be able to pay for what he would take of A."

The evil operation, naturally attendant on a high and discriminating tariff, to injure all markets abroad, is one which presses hard on the friends of such a system. And hence it is a favorite ground assumed by them, that the foreign markets are of trifling consequence to the producer, compared with the domestic or home market, and that they but little affect his prices; and that their system furnishes a demand so much better for all produced, as to atone for the loss of all markets abroad.

Now, sir, as these positions are deemed by their authors great pillars to support the protective sys-

tem, I will ask your indulgence a short time in order to expose how utterly unfounded they are on the real facts applicable to them; and to show afterwards the further evils of this system to navigation and the fisheries, and even to sound manufacturing industry; no less than to the great classes of consumers and producers so as to be entirely unatoned for by any benefits really resulting from it.

[Mr. W. commenced his remarks as to its effect on our markets, but gave way, at the request of his friends, to an adjournment. The next day, after some explanations, which are inserted in their appropriated places, he proceeded.]

In pursuing this discussion further, Mr. President, in the manner I have proposed, I would be trespassing uselessly on the patience of the Senate, if my best endeavors were not exerted to elicit truth—I would try to settle contradictory opinions as to some facts, by a fuller and more dispassionate consideration of them—and, if possible, reconcile a majority to such changes in the existing tariff as are, in painful sincerity, believed by me to be necessary for the preservation of sound principles in taxation, equal justice to all, and the prosperity and peace of the country.

The idea that our foreign markets had not improved under the lowering duties from 1832 to 1842, compared with what they were the ten years previous, under higher rates, was very erroneous.

The value of domestic produce exported in 1832, was \$49,874,079, and in 1832, but \$63,137,470, or an increase of only about 25 per cent., while, in 1842, the value was \$92,969,996, or an increase of near 50 per cent. If the aggregate of these exports, in all the first ten years, was compared with that of the last, the increase in the last over the first would be near 100 per cent. Some had supposed that this increase had been confined to southern staples alone; but while cotton had augmented, rice and tobacco had been nearly stationary; and the great staples of the West and Middle States, and North, not consumed by the South while making the cotton, and thus obtaining a larger and better market through the cotton raised and sent abroad, such as the exports of breadstuffs, pork, lard, beef, butter and cheese, lumber, lead, and even of manufactures, have augmented.

Indeed almost the whole of the fourteen and a half millions of pounds of lead we now send to foreign markets have sprung up within the last ten years; and, as shown in the table before me, even within the last three, our exports of beef have trebled. So of pork and lard, and also of butter and cheese. (Table No. 12.)

Again: An impression had, by some, been sedulously inculcated, that England took little or nothing of our domestic products for herself and her dependencies, and therefore we ought, in retaliation, to tax high her manufactures. I am not the apologist of either England or France in their ancient commercial policy, in some respects, towards this country. But it is due to historical truth and justice to admit that, of late years, they take large portions of our surplus produce, being our two greatest markets in the world.

In respect to England, when buying our productions which are not luxuries—like tobacco, standing on a peculiar and different basis—she takes them on duties not usually so high as our own, and recently under several reductions, which we had very illy reciprocated by the present higher tariff. Let us test this by evidence; for I ask nothing on naked assertion. I hold in my hand statements of our exports

of domestic produce to England and her dependencies in 1822, 1832, and 1842.—(Table 13.)

They increased about 24 per cent. in the first period, but over 40 per cent. in the last one; and they considerably exceed one-half of all our exports of that kind to all quarters of the globe. Is this nothing as a growing advantage, by way of market, to all our producers, and to be encouraged by reciprocal liberalism, especially when we recall to mind the further fact, that she takes even more of us, yearly, than we do of her, to the extent of four or five millions of dollars. Is not this such a favorable balance of trade to us, and such a large market—more than all the rest of the world—as to deserve some little regard and conciliatory spirit? Yet the policy of much of the existing tariff is, on the contrary, almost vindictive towards her chief productions. Again, as shown by my friend before me, [Mr. McDuffie,] she takes of our cotton over \$30,000,000 a year—nigh two-thirds of the whole amount exported—our greatest article sent abroad; and in which not South Carolina alone is interested, (as many affect to suppose,) but still more, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, with parts of North Carolina, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas, as well as, indirectly, every other State which furnishes to them supplies, agricultural or manufactured.

Beside this, and more than one-fifth of our rice exported, she takes over one-third of the tobacco; and has always been one of our largest customers for both; thus presenting, in spite of her large duties on the last as a luxury, one of the best markets for the great production of still other States, including Maryland, Virginia, Ohio, and Missouri. But it is often alleged, that she takes little that is the produce of the free States; and particularly of breadstuffs, pork, beef, &c., more directly interesting to the central States, those beyond the Alleghanies, and the agriculture, fisheries, and manufactures of the East. Fortunately, sir, when we take the trouble to scrutinize the official documents, this delusion becomes entirely dispelled.

In 1822, when we sent to England and her dependencies not one-third of all our exports of flour, wheat, corn, and other breadstuffs, her harsh system of corn laws had recently been adopted on the same high protective system in favor of her agriculture, which we ourselves have so indiscreetly introduced in the present tariff, to aid our manufactures. But, notwithstanding the just complaints against that system, our intercourse through her neighboring colonies, from which the duty is lower, and our proximity to her West India islands, gradually enabled us to send to her and her dependencies, at a profit, over one-half of all those exports; and by 1842, over two-thirds of the whole; and equalling in value fifty per cent. more than all the tobacco and rice sent to them.

In fine, she takes largely of our beef, pork, and tallow; also of the products of our forest and the ocean, and even of the factory, as well as of raw cotton and grain. And her increased and increasing demands for most of these, if not repulsed and thwarted by high tariffs, rendered this consideration a momentous one not only to the South, but to all the grain growing States, whether on the Atlantic, or on the rivers and lakes of the mighty West, and gave it an interest to every farmer, and fisherman, and many a mechanic, in the valleys and on the hill-tops, on the seashores and in the villages of the busy North. Without dwelling too long on details, the value of beef now taken by her is double what it was in 1822; the pork and lard near two hundred per cent. more; and the

butter and cheese near six times as much. While, from our forests, she purchases near one-fourth of what we export in lumber, and six-sevenths of all our tar and other naval stores.

[Mr. BENTON. Please to repeat that.]

Yes, sir. She takes quite six-sevenths of all our naval stores exported; and, though that is important to your native State, (North Carolina,) another fact is becoming still more important to the State of your adoption—to Missouri—and also to Illinois, that, instead of now importing most of our lead from England, we supply from our own mines, on account of their natural fertility, and not by hot-bed protection, firstly our own great wants, and next send it across the equator—double, with it, both the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn, and supply China; as well as the Sandwich islands of the Pacific; and last, but not least, send to England herself near one-sixth of the whole we now export, while in 1822 she took not a pound, and in 1832 but \$22 worth.

From our fisheries she takes, also, half the sperm oil we export, instead of nothing in 1822, and but a pittance in 1832. But let me ask the gentleman on the other side, if even the manufacturers would be quite as well situated as to a market for their eight or nine millions of exports, if England and her dependencies were not open to many of them? She has admitted even our cotton manufactures into India, and some of them were used to help to clothe the very troops that marched to Afghanistan. She takes an increasing quantity of our domestic salt in Canada; from one to two hundred thousand dollars' worth of our nails in her West Indies; more and more of our sperm and tallow candles; a third of a million of our manufactures from tobacco; and very considerable proportions of the soap, leather, shoes, boots, &c. &c., which help to swell the exports of our domestic manufactures.

But not to be tedious on this point, mark the contrast also in the present rate of her duties on many of these articles. On the greatest (cotton) only 7½ per cent.; on lard, only 7 per cent.; on wheat into Canada, only 7 cents per bushel; on beef and pork, but 2 cents a pound; and cheese, but 2½ cents. This will not be much over 20 per cent. on the whole of them, and some calculators have been enabled to push her average duties higher on articles which we raise, only by including tobacco, which is taxed high there as a luxury, and to bear on the rich; and some other articles, such as spirits and cider, which could not fairly be taken into the account, we ship so little of them to England, any more than cotton cloths, though only taxed 15 per cent.; woollens but 10 per cent.; linen 15 per cent.; and iron but 8 per cent.

Embracing corn, and their higher duty on our direct export of it to England, the average rate on the first class of articles would not rise to 25 per cent., as wheat, at the average price there, pays only about 30 or 32 per cent. duty, ranging lower or higher by a sliding scale, as the price there may rise or fall. To show what great advances she has recently made in relaxing her restrictive policy, by reducing her duties on articles which were high, and many of which greatly interest us, I have her old and new tariffs before me, and have placed several instances in parallel columns for convenience in reference, if any senator chooses to examine the matter further. (See table 14.)

Perhaps one reason, among others, why the corn duties have not been more relaxed, is the continued high discrimination which we still persist in against

manufactured articles such as she produces. And, as those duties there are a great engine of wrong and suffering, towards starving millions, and help to fill her slums—houses and prisons—leading to barn-burning, and mobs, and thefts, for vengeance or existence—there is little doubt that a relaxation there is desirable to many others, as well as the toiling millions; and that reciprocal legislation by us, in the spirit of her last tariff, would help to hasten a further reduction, and open a much larger vent for our grain and meats, at enhanced prices. A reciprocal arrangement of such a character can be effected by legislation, as well, if not better, than by treaty. The two countries are, in truth, fitted to consume largely of each other's surplus, sold by each (as it is) at cheaper rates than it can be produced by the other—she selling her manufactures of cotton cheaper, by machinery, skill, capital, and low wages; we, our cotton, grain, meats, and other materials, cheaper than hers, in consequence of a soil costing less and producing more, as well as being more lightly taxed. Nature and circumstances fit us both for mutual interchanges, on mutual low duties, to the mutual advantage of both, as much as do the tastes and formation of the two sexes suit them for each other's happiness. She needs, even on the present limited consumption, near two million quarters of wheat yearly from abroad. This alone gives a market for a quantity equal to the sixteen million surplus bushels of Ohio; and, if we supplied the whole, though at the reduced price of \$1.25 per bushel, when the average in England is \$1.75, it would be a gain of near four millions yearly. But the quantity consumed would be greatly increased by a reduction in the duty and price. The quantity taken beyond what is now taken, beside great additions to the meats, might reasonably be estimated at forty or fifty millions of bushels—a considerable portion of which we could furnish, as well as the north of Europe.

[Mr. HUNTINGTON inquired if Mr. W. estimated our crop of grains at only fifty millions of bushels, or stated that England took two-thirds of it.]

By no means, sir. The whole crop exceeds five hundred millions of bushels, including all the grains, and exceeds eighty-four millions of wheat alone, and England, of course, takes only two-thirds of all we send abroad. I have not been talking of a market abroad for all our agricultural productions, as those alone equal from six to eight hundred millions of dollars yearly, but of their surplus. Those productions—after supplying the wants of fifteen or sixteen millions of people engaged in or connected with the production of them, and three or four millions more connected with commerce and other pursuits—yield a surplus of near one hundred millions of dollars in value; and, as that finds abundant and high markets abroad, or otherwise, it affects the sales and prices of all which is transferred from producers to consumers at home, and serves to enrich or impoverish the whole country. The present tariff, I have shown, tends to drive us from the best foreign markets for the disposal of those surplus products; to lessen the number of those markets, as well as their demands, by provoking duties against us which are higher, and more embarrassing and injurious, by way of retaliation. It tends to injure us not only in England and France, but in Germany also, where the tariff usually does not exceed twenty per cent., and in Prussia is intended to be kept down still lower; and where, as in South America and Asia—great

and growing markets for many of our productions—the imposts are light, compared with our own.

Doing all we can by negotiation to correct inequalities against us elsewhere, let us, then, in the true and redeeming spirit of morals and sound legislation, proceed to do right ourselves in respect to the tariff—to set a good example of revenue duties—and then urge with effect, as we may, in England and France no less than Germany, a reciprocal liberality, in all such cases as are not now mutual, or are not precluded by a local policy as to luxuries.

But if other nations should not at once meet our reduction in duties, by corresponding ones on their part, we shall still, though ill requited by foreigners, be gainers from our own moderation, under the great principle that all consumers here will, by our reduction, pay less for what they buy from abroad; and the producers here will be better able to compete with others in the markets of the whole world, and will sell more, and will make more money on what they do sell, as the production of it here, under lower duties on all they consume, will cost them less.

The only rainbow which now tinges the gloom, is the hope that the tariff of 1842 may become in this way mitigated, if not abandoned here, and then still more abroad, and that improved foreign markets will be thus encouraged in Europe and South America, co-operating with the vast one just forced open in China, under a duty not ranging there, on an average, so high as twenty per cent.; and through which alone we may be able to aid more in supplying a population, equal to half that of the whole human race, with whatever our mines, or manufactures, or agriculture can furnish agreeable to their taste or suitable to their wants.

And what, sir, is offered in reply to all the dangers and losses a perseverance in this system exposes us to in our greatest foreign markets in Europe? A new and better home market instead of them. This is another of the plausible and deluding positions that reconcile many to the restrictive system; but which cannot stand the test of scrutiny or facts. There is a charm to the hearts of all, in the word "home." But do not the articles of comfort and necessity we procure abroad from all regions, help to increase the charm of home as well as what we raise or make nearer? The tea and coffee we drink from the Indies? the sugar we eat from Brazil? the clothes, and salt, and iron we use from Europe? Are they from all climes not procured by means of our labors at home, as well as the other articles we buy, that are made here? But, in an economical or pecuniary view, it is reiterated, again and again, that the home market is the best and an ample substitute for others. Can gentlemen dwell on this, when so vast a quantity of our productions, consumed at home, is never sold; but used by those raising or making them. Think you, that, for the rest which the producers may desire to exchange or sell, the home market of one or two millions of people only connected with manufactures, is as great as that abroad of near eight hundred millions? circling, as our commerce does, with that surplus to every zone, and every sea? and better and better still as would become the foreign markets, if we only encouraged more and more the principles of a freer trade with them? Recollect, too, that the home market is and always has been first supplied; but still it has proved, and always will prove, to be utterly insufficient for all we raise. Instead of being the best market for our surplus of a hundred millions yearly,

it is no market at all for it, and, but for the foreign markets, the whole would perish on our hands. Or the industry of the country would become so paralyzed as not to produce it, and obtain all the necessities and comforts it brings back in return, and showers over every fireside. So far from the home market being a substitute for the foreign for all these vast surplus productions, it is filled and glutted, and can take no more of them before they become a surplus. That position, then, is entirely indefensible. Others talk of the near exchanges in the home market, being much more profitable to the producer. But how is the fact? He may, to be sure, quickly exchange a bushel of wheat with a neighboring manufacturer for a shovel, each valued at a dollar. But if, in the freer trade and more open market abroad, under a low duty, the shovel, equally good, could be bought for eighty cents, taking off half the present average 40 per cent. duty, and his wheat sold 20 per cent. higher, or at a dollar and a fifth, will he not be forty cents better under the low duty? And after all the freight and charges, though equalling half the difference, if the village merchant performs both of these operations for him, and takes his wheat, and lets him have the shovel as quick as the manufacturer could, is he not still a gainer of twenty cents on a dollar and are not all the great channels, and means, and instruments of commerce, at the same time, more employed and invigorated by more freights? But others may argue, that by means of the restrictive system, manufacturers will increase so much faster than farmers, that the home market for domestic produce will enlarge so as speedily to consume all the usual surplus, though it will be at a lower price, probably, and furnishing manufactured fabrics at a higher price, as before shown, if a high duty is continued as necessary to protect them. But every one who scrutinizes our commercial records, knows that experience teaches just the reverse of this. The surplus productions, that the home market cannot purchase and consume, have increased, rather than diminished, since this restrictive system was in force. Under it, instead of its becoming less necessary to go abroad, it has become more necessary. In a country with such immense quantities of fertile land, at low prices, the agricultural productions increase faster, far, than the manufacturers; and every addition to our agricultural population, which is made at the rate of 4 per cent. yearly, augments, rather than diminishes, the surplus, as each new member of society here, instead of being, as in some countries, a new burden, and eating up a part of what the others have, or need, becomes a producer, and, ere long, adds yearly to the common income much more, on an average, than he consumes. Gentlemen seem blind to this beautiful and encouraging peculiarity in our national position, and which should justly render our country long a real asylum for the famished of all nations; and they find it difficult to get rid of European and Asiatic ideas, where agriculture is stationary, and every new birth tends to produce scarcity and suffering. Look at the official figures in connexion with these supposed facts. In 1816, by imposing higher duties, we were assured that an additional and better home market would speedily be created by an increase in manufactures, and all our surplus productions would be consumed here, and profitably, and the country become independent of foreign markets, and of the pauper labor of Europe.

How has this prediction been verified? So far from happening, in the next eight years ruin overspread the country, and the home market utterly failed as to our surplus. Again: the duties, in 1824, were raised still higher, with a promise that the hope would then be fulfilled, under great additions to our manufactures. They were said to be on the eve of taking root. But, in only four short years, again disappointed in the growth and sufficiency of the home market, came the higher tariff of 1828; and again in 1842, to run another disappointing round, comes a tariff still higher than that of 1828. In the mean time, to test, by the actual official figures, how poorly the home market has grown in a whole quarter of a century, so as to absorb all or most of our surplus, it appears that this surplus, now required to be exported or to rot on our hands, is near a hundred per cent. more than it was twenty years ago; and, as before shown, the aggregate of it, exported during the last ten years, is more than double what the aggregate was in the previous ten. Even during the greatest height of the duties, it appears, by the tables used on the other side, from 1821 to 1832, the period when the duties began to be reduced, the surplus, instead of being more and more used up here and purchased in the home market, increased from \$43,671,894 to \$63,137,470—about 50 per cent.

At this rate of progress in the home market, (taking off all our surplus,) it would not be effected till doomsday; and, indeed, would yearly grow worse and worse, instead of better and better. But if any senator supposes that it is possible, under this new and higher tariff, in the face of these recorded facts, to tempt so many more into manufacturing as to augment their demand somewhat faster and check somewhat the production, what, in the mean time, is to become even of the reduced surplus and the owners of it, till the whole is yearly absorbed? And what but ruin—widespread and inevitable ruin—must gradually overshadow and overwhelm the whole of them? No, sir. Our reason, our experience, our common sense, when applied to this novel condition, show that, beyond all the home market can take, a surplus from agriculture will, on the contrary, grow as our settlements grow; and more and more need foreign markets, till our people, if remaining free and united, cover the spaces between the Mississippi and the Rocky mountains, and thence to the Pacific, moving westward as a branch of the Caucasian race to the farthest limits of the globe. Saying nothing now of Texas or Canada, this growth in agriculture will never halt till a denser population, and older skill, and greater capital, divert a larger proportion profitably and naturally to such manufactures as can flourish here without artificial stimulus. Let me entreat gentlemen not to overlook these unerring indications of the present utter insufficiency of the home market, because we happen to do what is so much relied on in this debate—consume a hundred thousand bales of cotton more than we did ten years ago. Can they forget that we produce probably a million more bales than we did ten years ago, or as much in all as it was then estimated was grown in the whole world? And what is to become of the additional nine hundred thousand bales beyond all the larger home market takes, unless it is sent abroad? And do they not see, by the very last arrivals, that England, in a single year, has bought and consumed half as much more of our cotton as the whole wants of our home market? Even France consumes 50 per cent. more

of our cotton than all our home market; though, in 1857, the manufacturers themselves estimated that we then used as much of it as she did. Hence, in point of fact, the French market alone, beside the greater increase in England, has far outstripped, in its demands and wants of this article, all our boasted home market.

But if we were generally to compare markets for raw cotton—the home, and the foreign—when in fact, it is not a comparison, but a clear gain of all the foreign ones, what is the result? The foreign took last year 2,200,000 bales, to only about 300,000 consumed at home—or more than seven times as much, and the greater demands of England alone, are such, that she makes two hundred and fifty millions worth yearly of cotton fabrics, to our forty-seven and a half millions—or five hundred per cent. more.

A senator on the other side has talked of the great home market of England for her own manufactures, and has held it up as an example to us. But does he not know, that after supplying all her home market, she has a surplus of manufactures, for which she must and does find other markets in her foreign possessions or in foreign countries, and large and numerous ones, or she would not live unprostrated a single year? The exports from two hundred to two hundred and thirty millions of dollars a year of surplus manufactures beyond all her home market—independent of other domestic productions, equal near \$70,000,000 more. All this immense sum would become lost, the articles valueless, if she did not find or provide foreign markets for it. This is, in truth, as to principle, the example that should be held up for us.

She has negotiated, and colonized, and fought, for a century or more, to extend the foreign markets, to consume her products; and, without those markets, would have continued what she before was, a second or third rate power in Europe, or would long since have sunk under her wars and debt, instead of being, as she is now, the preponderating power in the world. Assisted by those markets, she has been enabled to add not only possession after possession there, but in Africa and America; and empire after empire in Asia and Australia, until her landed capital away from home is valued at more than half its great amount there, and her tributary population away is more than tenfold the rest; all of it exceeding one hundred and eighty millions. Thus, while the annual produce of Great Britain alone is only about \$2,500,000,000, she has one of near \$4,400,000,000, including her dependencies; and, while the population of most European countries consume per head only about two-thirds of a shilling's worth of her manufactures, and we but seventeen shillings per head, her colonies in America consume thirty-one and a half shillings' worth per head; those in the West Indies seventy-two, and those of British origin in Australia two hundred and thirty-five, and thus indirectly help much to build up and sustain her vast industry at home.

What we, too, would have been but for our foreign markets was forcibly shadowed forth during the embargo of 1808, and the non-intercourse in 1809, and in a remoter degree during a part of the war of 1812. All those measures may have been proper, looking to high political considerations; but what did the farmer and shipowner think of the blessings and excellences of a home market alone during the period when little was sent abroad? For many years, beside England and France for large foreign

markets for our greatest staples, what should we have been without still others? without breaking into the formerly-prohibited possessions of Spain in America? without a more enlarged intercourse with the vast empire of Brazil? without more extensive markets in Germany, and our vessels exporting our products more and more to remotest Asia and the isles of the Pacific? Waiving further illustrations on this, it could hardly be credited, that the protective system was so obstinately adhered to, when it not only tended to injure all foreign markets, and throw us on the insufficient home one, but to drive from the ocean much of the ships and navigators and capital engaged in transporting these surplus productions to those markets in almost every region, and bringing back, in return for them, the spare comforts and necessities of every other people.

The injurious influence of this high system of duties on our whole navigation, domestic as well as foreign, was capable of demonstration. It had often been boasted of as an antagonist system to that of foreign trade; and the arguments to justify it had been not only such as we have been refuting, but that the navigating interest, as a whole, would not suffer, if cut off from abroad, in a considerable degree, because the coasting trade would be so much more augmented as to make up for all loss in that which was foreign. A moment's examination, however, will show the whole of this to be equally delusive with the idea that, by a high tariff, a new and better home market is substituted for the foreign.

In the first place, the increased duty over 20 per cent. on the imported hemp, iron, and cordage, which enter into ship building has been carefully computed to equal at least five dollars a ton. This, on our whole tonnage of 2,092,360 tons, would be an additional tax, as it is repaired and rebuilt, of \$10,461,800. If the whole is renewed in five years, on an average, the new burden would equal annually \$2,092,360. If gentlemen spread the renewal over more years, the proportion is only varied. Almost half of this tax falls on the tonnage engaged in foreign trade, and the rest on that in the fisheries and domestic navigation. There is no difference thus far in favor of the latter; while the former, as to repairs, can sometimes gain a little advantage over the latter, by being able to supply sails and cables abroad not so highly taxed.

To show the force of this new burden more strongly by an illustration on a smaller scale, readily comprehended, and coming nearer home to the business and bosoms of my constituents—take the tonnage of New Hampshire, which is mostly confined to the one small port of Portsmouth, whose population is between seven and eight thousand. Its foreign tonnage alone, is about 15,000, on which five dollars increased duties amounts to \$75,000; and which, spread over five years, for such repairs and renewals as are equal to its present value, would be yearly about two dollars per head for the whole population of that town. This is as much as all their other taxes united. But, in the next stage of its evil operation, it falls heavier on the foreign than the domestic trade; for the tonnage in that, costing more than it otherwise would, cannot afford to carry freights so low as it otherwise might, and must charge higher to the owner of the produce and merchandise, and thus devolve a part, or all the increased tax on them, or submit, as it does in most cases, under the competition of vessels from abroad, not so highly taxed, to carry freights at the old, or a still lower price. The raiser of the produce might be

pleased to find transportation cheaper, if effected fairly, and in free and equal competition; but must regret to see it at the expense of the navigator, and under a system of vicious legislation, which makes it lower virtually by discriminating duties against our own citizens, and in favor of foreigners.

Let our own citizens in honest and useful pursuits have, at least, an equal chance with others. No onerous burdens—an open sea, a flowing sail, and a fair fight, in industry and enterprise, and not a novel kind of navigation act, made by ourselves, favorable to foreigners, and hostile to Americans. The day for great exclusive privileges to navigation had long gone by, as unnecessary, both in this country and England; and Cromwell's famous navigation act, however extolled by the senator from Maine, had, in the time of it and since, been regarded by many as impolitic, and had virtually been abandoned in England the last twenty years, in several important respects. Dutch pride had been humbled by Blake before it passed, and Dutch prosperity had been sapped by her wars and high taxes, rather than by British legislation. It would be idle for England or this country, or any other power, ever to expect durably great prosperity by legislation, however full of bounties or restrictions, unless their people are islanders or fishermen, or have natural facilities in naval stores and harbors for extensive commerce.

Our tonnage has seldom been more flourishing, except during the calamitous wars of Europe, than under our low duties most of the time, from 1830 to 1840. It increased 95 per cent., while the English, in that period, our great rivals, increased but 49 per cent., and the French only 50; while during the last year, it has declined in quantity, besides being much less profitable. By the operation of high restrictions, the exports, too, are expected to be lessened through an increased home market. The system has naturally that tendency, in conformity with its design, as we have seen in the official returns, by the exports proving nearly double as much under ten years of falling duties as ten of high ones. But the boast by some, that if it cuts off agricultural exports, it makes and substitutes as many manufactured ones, has been verified very badly, as while the former, in ten years, has added twenty millions, the latter has added but two or three, and the cotton manufacture only half a million. The foreign imports and exports are intended to be diminished by the very essence of the system. Especially is it aimed at the imports, intending to substitute in their stead domestic products of a like character. Such, too, has been the effect of it here. When it got into full operation after 1818, the imports began to fall off; and they never rose, during the full continuance of the system to 1833, so high again as in that year, though swollen much, from time to time, by the foreign loans to the States, brought home in merchandise.

Again: under its operation the past year, the imports have fallen, in the aggregate, near eleven millions, and of the consumable commodities, and such as pay much freight, over thirty millions; there being, I understand, near twenty millions of the free goods this year in specie over and above the quantity in 1842, and, indeed, over what has been re-exported this year. Do the navigating interest lose nothing by this reduced quantity and value of the imports to be freighted; considering, also, at the same time, that the whole exports in 1843 have become less, by four to five millions, than in 1842?

But, while the tonnage engaged in the foreign trade is undergoing this loss of values to be carried both ways across the ocean; beside the still greater loss in reduced prices for freights, the chairman says the inward freights have been better. If he means by that, our ships have brought home a larger portion of all imports than usual, I do not see anything in that to indicate improvement; because they being cut off, by a high tariff, from bringing home iron, hemp, &c., as much as usual, have been glad, rather than come home in ballast, to take anything at little profit.

[Mr. EVANS said he meant that the price of freights was higher.]

By no means generally. For where thirty or forty shillings a ton has been got formerly for some freights from Liverpool, it has, I understand, in certain cases, in 1843, been brought for eight shillings; and where a penny per pound has once been got for carrying raw cotton to Europe, half a penny only has of late been obtained in many cases, and a hundred vessels are now probably waiting in New Orleans for freights.

But how fares the coasting trade, which is to be so greatly promoted by such a tariff? The owner of the tonnage in that, whether on the seaboard or our inland seas and mighty rivers, is, to be sure, protected from foreign competition. But he must suffer to the whole extent of the increased cost of his vessel, and carry at the same price for freight as before; or, if he raises the freight so as to indemnify himself, will only shift a large burden from his own shoulders to those of the producer or consumer, already so oppressed; and, instead of anybody being benefited by the high duty except the manufacturer, an additional tax falls on most if not all others. The tax, too, reacts sometimes on the hardy ship-builder. If his material cost more and he can sell no higher, it equals a million to three, fourths a year on the outfit in 1842; and, as the business will thicken, must extend its baleful influences to the lumber-man, the timber grower, and all the mechanical trades engaged in ship-building and repairs. But look a little further at the next step in its bad consequences.

How is the remuneration for all this to occur in the increase of the domestic tonnage? Does that, as is estimated, have more to carry, and further, than it did when the foreign trade was larger? So far from it, all the domestic agricultural produce, which is sold at New York, Boston, and Providence, is brought no farther from the West or South, and its returns are carried back no farther than if the additional consumption, supposed to be caused near those places had been transported abroad, or the additional manufacturing products made near, and to be sent back to the South or West, came from abroad. But the whole foreign freights of it, and all the persons and capital and profits of true American origin and character connected therewith, are frustrated, and the nation paralyzed, not only in one of its great arms of industry and means of rearing seamen for maritime defence in war, but nothing whatever gained in place of those vital losses by any enlargement of our domestic tonnage. More, sir. As the system expands, the manufacture is calculated to spread nearer to the South and West, and establishments to spring up on the slopes of the Alleghanies, and many of the tributaries to the Mississippi and the lakes. All can see that, as these approach nearer the raw materials which they consume, whether cotton, corn, flour, meats, or other

articles, the domestic transportation, both to and fro, is shortened, and requires less time, capital, and employment for the home tonnage.

Pray tell me, then, whether the effect of this system on the navigating interest, foreign or domestic, be not highly injurious, an unmitigated evil, and what there possibly can be in it to atone to the commercial classes for its destructive influences?

The constitution itself was formed chiefly to protect our foreign commerce; as the framers of it, whether farmers, merchants, or planters, saw that on the success of that commerce depended the value of all the surplus crops, the ease and cheapness with which they reached good markets. The vessel was like the cart and wagon to hasten the crop onward to a good market; and the lower the cost of the vessel, the less it was taxed, and the more markets it would freely resort to, the higher would be the prices obtained for the cargo, and more reduced the expense of getting home their returns. If good highways, bridges and canals, and railroads, are a public blessing, and to be sought, for their benefit in internal commerce, so are all improvements by steamboats, faster sailing vessels, cheaper building, and lower duties, and less vexatious regulations, equal blessings to the producer and consumer, no less than to the navigator. The blow struck, then, by this restrictive system to the commerce of the country, whose numbers and capital are nearly as large, if not larger than those of the manufacturers, and a very valuable and useful and indeed national interest, in the view of the framers of the constitution, is a blow falling, at the same time, with as much, if not greater force, on all the producers and consumers of the country.

The hardy and adventurous fisherman feels it the most, both as navigator and producer of a new article of food. He gets no additional drawback or bounty, on account of the higher duties and greater cost of his vessel, and has to sustain the shock after a considerable depression in the prosperity of his business. Computing the whole tonnage in the fisheries at 210,000; the loss on that, in a few years, must be equal to \$1,050,000, while the exports of dried fish (his gains as a producer) have almost ceased, and the whole business in whaling suffered rivalry and loss from the manufacture of lard oil.

If the hog, then, is painted in the West as devouring the whale, and if the white fish of the lakes are transported to the East, and sold even in sight of the flakes of our coast, as has happened the last season, so be it, if the result of equal laws and fair competition. But do not neglect or oppress that class whose numbers, though so noiseless, exceed all in the cotton manufactures of the whole Union, and were deemed so national an object by our fathers, forming a nursery not only for our commercial marine, but our gallant navy, and who aided so ably in the capture of Louisburg, (under a commander whose tomb and dwelling-house are near the mouth of the chief harbor of my State); and even mingled with Rodgers's rangers, and helped to conquer Quebec; and poured out their blood like water on the decks of Paul Jones in the revolution, as well as in the hardest sea fights of Hull, Bainbridge, and Decatur, in the late war. Rely on it, sir, always, in all exigencies, will they be found at their posts; and will compare in morals and worth, no less than daring courage, with any class of the North. The policy of England, on the contrary, has been to continue carefully to cherish her fisheries as well as navigation. Her annual income from

this source is computed at twenty millions of dollars; while ours, at only half that, and under depression, was to be further prostrated by the renewal of this restrictive policy. England, also, so far from increasing the burdens on her navigation, when embarrassed, has sought out new markets for it to visit, new products to be carried, and lowered the duties on all it consumes. Hence her tariff on hemp was low, and had been reduced—on timber, a trifle, if from her colonies, and on iron merely nominal.

But, beyond all this, the policy in our present tariff aimed at the destruction of the reciprocal treaties we possessed as to tonnage; and, in that way, would destroy the noblest carrying trade of the world. It breathed hostility to everything savoring of free trade, because a standing censure on their discriminating course. These treaties had already been threatened again and again, though without them we could claim no transportation of anything but exports of our own productions, as all other nations had a like right to carry the export of theirs. This would give us, in practice, only half the freights of all our exports and imports, and half the number of ships or tonnage engaged in our foreign trade. Many seem to believe we do not possess so great a proportion as that now, and a change is called for by the opponents of free trade; and a hue-and-cry is raised, that most of our foreign commerce is in foreign bottoms; and that English navigation, in particular, is yearly crowding us from the ocean. But how is the naked truth? and what are the losses and dangers the restrictive system is exposing us to? Setting aside the colonial intercourse between us and the British provinces, (which rests on peculiar principles, and, by frequent entries and clearances with passengers and steamboats, and little freight, has a fallacious appearance as to entries, though, in fact, we carry three-fourths of the freights,) the American tonnage, entering and clearing abroad, is nearly treble in quantity that of all the rest of the world; and the freights we brought home were, in 1842, valued to the extent of \$58,724,280; and all others only \$11,437,807. Those we carried out were quite three-fourths. These are near the proportions for some years. Who, after so many statements to the contrary, can look, but with amazement, on the comparisons in the table in my hands, compiled from official returns, of the greater number of entries by American than foreign vessels, from each of the great powers in the world, in 1842, as well as most of the smaller ones, except two, and think what must be the tendency of a system which would exchange this four-fifths for only half of the trade? (Table No. 15.)

We, from all the world, except the British colonies, had 1,259 vessels entering here, and all other powers, but 916; we, from England herself 614; she, and all other foreigners thence to us, but 370; we, from France, 406 vessels, and all others thence but 74; we, from Spain, 1,500, of which two-thirds were from Cuba; to all others, 82; we, even from Brazil, about which so much has been said, 174; and all others but 26. And, indeed, in all quarters of the globe, there are only two small governments, Sweden and the Hanse Towns, in which the balance is against us, and that balance in both of them inclusive not so much as it is in our favor with the small republic of Texas, in our own neighborhood. Yet those two trifling exceptions are often inconsiderately thrust forward, as conclusive evidence of the general operation of the reciprocal system on our for-

sign tonnage. Leaving other interesting details, I would only add, that another evil consequence from annulling the reciprocity system would be to destroy the whole of our carriage of all the ten to twenty millions which we yearly export of articles of foreign origin. Besides this, it will cut off a profitable and large branch of the carrying trade, nothing of which appears on our official records. It is of this character. Probably 100 to 150 American vessels clear yearly from Cuba to various parts of the world with sugar, molasses, and coffee, whose cargoes make no part of our commercial statistics. Many more clear also from Brazil, and some from various other ports in both hemispheres with cargoes for various quarters, of which we learn nothing, except by foreign statistics, and consular returns, or by the profits at some future period brought home in valuable imports. Something like 30 of our vessels have yearly gone with freights to those very *Hanse Towns*; some to Antwerp and Trieste, and others still to other ports in the Baltic, from Brazil and Cuba, who, without the principle of our reciprocal treaties, could not thus carry a ton of foreign produce. Let then the northern shipowner then look to consequences before he longer approves a policy, likely to end in the destruction of much of this superiority on our part, in the indirect as well as direct carrying trade, and in a commercial marine second only to one power in the known world.

Let the farmer of the mammoth West and of the central States look to this, and the manufacturer, as well as navigator, of the North. Why, sir? Because this very trade, which makes a market for breadstuffs, lard, fish, and most of our exported manufactures in Cuba, Mexico, and Brazil, does it only because the sugar, coffee, and molasses, obtained in exchange, have been, in a great degree, shipped to the north of Europe, and their proceeds returned here in those very articles of foreign iron and hemp, which the present tariff and its anti-commercial policy tend to reject.

I hasten to the last consideration intended to be urged on this occasion; which is, that a tariff like this is not founded on a policy likely to be useful permanently to the true manufacturing industry of the country. What that branch of industry really needs, is a natural adaptation in the climate, raw material, or mines of the country, to aid the particular business pursued; and a steady, durable, incidental protection, by collecting, on revenue principles, a suitable portion of revenue from imports. This, too, had better be moderate and durable, with equal regard to all interests, than high and vacillating under party excitement. It had better, even for the manufacturer, be incidental to a clear revenue power and practice, than direct and high in the exercise of a protective power of doubtful character, and had better be equal to all interests, as well as manufactures, so far as incident to a just impost on imports, than be unequal, and thus exposed to changes and unpopularity as partial on the one hand, and oppressive on the other. Such a moderate and stable protection as this to manufactures I never shall resist, any more than did our fathers in their early tariffs, raising all of their revenue in that manner (rather than by direct taxes) which they needed and could obtain, without going above the revenue standard, and thereby injuring commerce, agriculture, and other great interests. Manufactures, under that system, flourished wherever the country was fitted for them; and the sagacity of such men as Franklin and Jefferson saw that

they would continue to grow, if lucrative, considering our state of society; and that they would succeed best, not by unnatural, but natural aid, and would push forward steadiest, under their own enterprise and vigor, by moderate duties, and the wants of the country, rather than by being driven ahead of them by forced marches under legislative favor. They did not follow the shiftless system of running to the government for everything, any more than did the farmers, lawyers, or doctors, any of whom, when in trouble, might as well ask public legislation to assist them. On the contrary, the reliance of all men should be on their own energies and skill, and local advantages, looking—as Sir Robert Peel at last sensibly advises the Tamworth farmers to do, after experiencing the evils of a different course—more to their manures, and less to government.

Even in 1791 many of the manufacturers (and especially the household ones) had acquired a strong foothold among our people. They were enabled to supply nearly as large a proportion of our wants then in cottons, woollens, soap, cabinet work, potters' ware, paper, oils, candles, &c., as they do now.

Mr. Dallas, also, in 1816, considered many manufactures as fully established, woollens, cottons, and linen, in some districts supplying "two-thirds, three-fourths, and even four-fifths" of their wants. But after the war, and individual enterprise had multiplied great corporate establishments for making cottons and woollens, which had not previously been so thrifty, the system of direct protection was demanded and acquiesced in for a temporary object to break the fall, or make the transition easier to a state of peace; but under a strong expectation that its continuance would be limited and temporary. The history of its influence since, even on many manufactures, is well known to have developed many mischiefs. First, it has been very fluctuating; the high protection and large profits at first tempting too much capital and too prematurely into such business; and thus soon reducing profits and leading to clamorous demands for duties still higher; and then, in hundreds of instances, of the finer branches of manufactures, after a series of additional protections, becoming inflated, till the bubble burst, and deplorable bankruptcies followed. It was a kind of intemperate excitement, that only required, in time, additional stimulants, till means and patience were exhausted, and the patient sunk. While other manufacturers not brought into being that way, and a few of those with agents of great foresight and skill, managed so as to continue through every revulsion, and yield fair profits. These last would continue to do the same under a revenue tariff with the aid of its steady and durable incidental protection. In the next place all can see that, if the increased duty makes the manufacture very profitable, it may soon become a political hobby to sustain or enlarge it in order to gratify those interested. Or if speculative rather than political manufacturing mingles with honest enterprise in procuring for it additional protection, a sale of the stock is made before a large diversion of capital and persons into this most profitable employment takes place, and reduces the income lower than the general standard, and often throws the loss, as in the mania about merino sheep and morus multicaulis, on unsuspecting purchasers. Besides this, if the manufacture be new and the owners inexperienced, or have skilful competitors abroad, and countries to contend with where labor and capital are much lower,

the business longer established, and where improvements in machinery are frequent, the enterprise will become a most hazardous and changeable one. It is my serious belief that, from such causes and various abortive experiments, and a want of skilful agents, and little omissions to procure early improvements and the best workmen, &c., &c., more capital has been lost in the last twenty years in the manufactures of cotton and woollen in New England alone, than the whole capital which is left in those branches, or the whole debt at the close of our revolution. Some of us there can speak feelingly and experimentally on this subject. At the same time, I neither conceal nor deny, that, from skilful attention and other fortunate circumstances, others have made large profits. But, as a whole, what have the Union, and especially New England, gained in the long run by such a system? They have gained, I admit, by those manufactures which grow without the aid of a hot-bed system; they will continue to gain by them. So have they gained by household manufactures of wool and cotton, where pursued at leisure moments, and by the decrepid or young, not fitted for much other employment, though unprofitable otherwise, now on a large scale, without the aid of modern machinery. But, under the first circumstances, they are often economical, healthy, moral; and it is they which Mr. Jefferson so eloquently commends as late as 1812, and Franklin as early as 1784.

The theory of the old and true policy was to let industry, of its own accord, and not by artificial exertions, pursue what was most natural to our state of society, the free genius and institutions of our people, and their position on the surface of the earth; not seeking to raise tropical fruits for our markets in the temperate zone, or to make our population live merely on exhilarating gas and champagne. What do gentlemen imagine has been the decline in such manufactures, after all the machinery and hot-bed aid to others—and others, too, whose great use of machinery, it is argued, sinks the household labors into insignificance and loss? Why, sir, though the prices of the last are little affected by the tariff, (they being mostly made to use, and not to sell,) yet, by the census, the "family made goods," mostly wool and flax, equal yearly near \$30,000,000. They are stated at \$29,023,360; when the great woollen establishments, about which our halls have been so loudly and frequently besieged, yield only \$20,896,999; and the cotton establishments, noisier than their own spindles, yield but \$46,350,453. This is near half as much household, as both cotton and woollen of the great separate establishments. These returns are, doubtless, imperfect in some degree, but equally so as to both kinds. To see, also, how little the whole manufactures of the country have increased in the aggregate during 30 years, with such vast governmental protection, they are now returned at only \$239,836,224, when, in 1810, they were computed at \$117,694,602, and when the cottons, in 1831, were estimated by their friends at \$40,000,000, and have increased since but little more than six; and in 1810, with wool and flax, were estimated as high as they are now alone, except six to seven millions. And when the other manufactures, which sprung up before the protective system in 1816, have increased much faster in proportion, and those great industrial pursuits less protected, and even in some respects oppressed, have in agriculture probably quadrupled their annual produce, and nearly trebled

the exports of domestic origin, after supplying any additional home market. They have risen from \$42,366,659, in 1810, to \$113,805,634 in 1840. This is because the last is a congenial, suitable, and healthy employment, and the other, in most cases, is artificial, premature, and sickly.

Let it not be said that I wish to see the gains by modern machinery and steam abandoned, where these last can be used for large purposes, and with profit. But I would not see them attempted where the state of society, capital, and skill is not favorable to compete with others in the use of them, without ruinous risks and losses, unless bolstered up by high duties and taxes. I would buy and use such manufactures whenever cheapest and best; but for numerous home wants in a new and agricultural country, like much of ours, why not take what is produced by such establishments and improvements elsewhere, beyond what can be furnished through the frugal aid of household life? Why tempt our own people, by bounties, into the heated atmospheres of great establishments, forced into being, often prematurely here, by high duties, and at the expense of other large classes? What commendation can be bestowed on these, in a country young and enterprising, over the bracing air of the ploughman's field, or the rosy exercises of the dairy, or the transportation of the products of both over the mountain wave, and throwing the line and harpoon in every sea? Most persons point to New England as the best illustration of the great profits by the protective system. But beside the mischiefs already alluded to as incidental to it, what has she gained from it in other respects, when all her population connected with her great cotton establishments, would not fill a single county in several of our States? When the fisheries alone support greater numbers? When many of her sons are, in their habits, almost as web-footed as the sea-fowl which fly over their heads; when, if not diverted from agriculture, and navigation, and the fisheries, her hill-sides would, probably, have been ploughed nearer their tops, her swamps more thoroughly drained, her manures improved, additional inventions in raking, threshing, reaping, and sowing, sought out, or the present ones discovered sooner; her fisheries doubled and grown to what they are in England, and her ships still more and more carrying the surplus produce of much of the civilized world.

Her population and capital would, in that event, have been as large, if not larger, than now, and quite as hardy, moral, useful, and American, as it is now; and, by moderate and regular profits, far less tempting to inroads on our frugal habits, and on our primitive morals, now exposed to smuggling and all its train of demoralizations.

To be sure we have the flourishing villages that were often referred to. But, in one of them, a whole crop of early proprietors had lost their investments; in another, the church was deserted, and the dwellings and factory buildings desolate; and in the interior, numerous other cases existed of dilapidation and ruin to early establishments called prematurely and unskilfully into being by the bounties of your high protecting duties. And it was melancholy to reflect that even where some establishments had prospered, and cities clustered around them, it had been at the loss of the more remote country, draining it often of capital as well as enterprise and labor; and causing decline and desertion in one place to produce business and display in another.

Suppose, then, that their profits are great in some

establishments, and the wages of labor, as well as dividends on capital, high. Suppose, too, that there, in the vibrations of traffic, prices and markets, some have yielded exorbitant profits; yet they cannot long continue to do it steadily, without tempting (where everything is so open and free) other labor and other capital to flock to them and equalize their profits to what are made in other branches of industry. The whole business in cottons, woollens, iron, &c., on a large scale, depends so much for profits on little improvements in machinery and chemistry, &c., that the perils and reverses at times appal the stoutest heart. While, on the contrary, the large gains from machinery, which have been referred to by the chairman, are not permanent to that class, but temporary to them, though permanent and useful to the world at large. Others soon come in and employ them also, till the rate of profits is but little higher than in other pursuits. Hence, granting that England has not merely the labor of two millions, but over fifty millions of men, in her cotton machinery alone, and that of three hundred millions of men in all her manufactures—with machinery so perfect, that, if not talking, it tells when a thread breaks, or the water-power vacillates,—has not France, also, and Germany, and the United States, no less than her people, burst down the barriers of patents and the restrictions against the export of machinery, and let in all nations to the benefits of it, and reduced the profits of those using it to near the standard in other pursuits, unless raised higher, for a time, by discriminating and partial duties? Doctor Faustus, when he invented the type, might, like any other monopolist, profit much for a while by keeping the improvement secret, and adhering to old prices; but, soon as the invention becomes known, or the monopoly broken down, the individual gains in printing as well as other businesses, aided by machinery, had to stand little, if any higher, than those in employments not so aided. And pray tell me, sir, as a question of profit to the whole country by machinery in manufactures, and aids not derived from labor, is there no profit also to the whole by labor-saving machinery in agriculture—the plough and the scythe—by raking with horse power, and threshing, and even reaping and cleaning grain, the same way? But, much more, is there nothing in the dews and rains, and winds and sunshine, with which God has blessed peculiarly, and always will bless, his chosen race, the tillers of the soil?—nothing to aid the country in navigation beyond labor and capital?—nothing in the oceans, lakes, and rivers, that cover three-fourths of the globe, for highways to the seaman and merchant?—nothing in the winds, which blow freely to wait him?—nothing to the country in the fisheries, beyond labor and the vessel?—nothing in the shore and bank treasures of the finny tribes, growing for the adventurer without pay or expense; and the whales, which, unhired, await his coming in every sea? Opening the earth to all profitable employments, the bounties of Providence naturally attract more to agriculture, not only from its healthfulness, but safety and its best guards against famine and disease, so incident to crowded manufacturing. In the worst revulsions, the surplus of grain and meat can help to sustain life; but neither cottons nor woollens nor iron can be eaten, when markets fail, or war cuts off other supplies.

In another point of view, the supposed gain to this country by the use of machinery in great manufacturing establishments becomes, in truth,

only a question between the expediency of having them used here, where dearest, least understood, or least perfect, and abroad, where it is the reverse.

So, if we go to the statistics of the late census, similar results are demonstrated. It is imperfect in some respects, and conclusions somewhat different are drawn by different persons. But after being revised and corrected, the gains in manufacturing, though high, are probably not much higher than in other pursuits, if we deduct what is added by the discriminating duties. Without that deduction they reach near \$160 yearly on an average to each person employed and connected with them; whereas in agriculture, they yield but \$62, or less than half, and in navigation only \$30.

[Mr. EVANS here denied that he had stated the earnings in manufactures to be so high.]

No, sir; but the official returns, when duly revised, state this; and it can be accounted for fully in no other way than the protection they enjoy—great, even on a 20 per cent. duty, and much more on one of eighty or a hundred.

[Mr. EVANS said a deduction for interest on capital in manufactures should be made.]

So it might be in all other pursuits, as well as this, when you come to divide the gross produce between the capitalist and the laborer. But it happened that the capital was larger per head in agriculture, than in manufactures; it being \$235 each in the first, and \$200 only in the last, though in navigation it was higher, being \$303 each. (Tables No. 15 and 16.)

Gentlemen may take whichever horn of the dilemma is most agreeable; and if the profits are no higher, after the reduction of the gain by high duties than in other pursuits, there is no advantage to the whole country by the forcing system. We pay for all we get. But if they are higher after it, then the forcing is not necessary, besides its being partial and wasteful in order to aid them.

Many, however, urge that manufactures ought to be encouraged by a costly protective system, because their labor and business are so much more American than any other. The additional persons it employed in this country, it was argued, increased the public prosperity and independence enough to counterbalance all the evils of so unnatural and burdensome a system. Now, sir, a little analysis will expose the folly of this assumption. When more persons were tempted by war duties and privations, and then by the high discriminating tariffs which followed, to embark in manufactures, whence came they? They were either imported foreigners, (against whom, however, he nurtured no idle prejudices,) or they were Americans, previously engaged in agriculture, commerce, and the fisheries.

Now, did this change in pursuit of a thousand Americans increase the number of Americans before existing? It was still but a thousand in the new employment. And did the change make their labor and capital any more American than it had been before, by going from agriculture to manufacturers? So, if a portion of our present manufacturers under lower duties should quit these for the plough, the counter, or the deck, where they or their fathers before labored,—would they, by this restoration, cease to be Americans, or their industry cease to be American? By no means. And the prejudice excited by partisans against the foreign or pauper labor of Europe, in order to color the truth as to the case just stated, (but which it is perceived has no

concern with it, as, after and before the change, the labor of the same persons is just as American and just as little European as it was before,) is a prejudice which is to operate only when beneficial to them, and never when hostile to their interests. They never reject the *pauper labor* of Europe, if it emigrates here and works at lower wages in their establishments; but they invite it hither and hunt for it in Canada. They never reject it, if it comes here in the shape of new improvements in their machinery or dyes; but they send agents across the Atlantic to buy and import it. In fine, they never reject, but discriminate in favor of it, as compared with other articles, if it comes here as a raw material useful to manufactures.

The beggarly lazzaroni of Naples may labor to collect rags for paper, and it is all very well for the manufacturer to encourage it by a low rather than prohibitory duty, and make the community pay a high one on the paper manufactured from them. The convict laborer of New Holland, and the slaves of Morocco, may shear cheap wool and send it here free, or at a pittance of duty, to be used by the manufacturers, while those who use the woollens made from it must pay a high tax on them. Even the Indian toil of Chili or Buenos Ayres may throw the lasso and collect hides at small expense, and the manufacturers are willing to benefit at the lowest duties on them by all that pauper labor, and charge us high for the leather made from them; and act similarly by the labor of the serfs of Russia in raising hemp, which, though paying a higher duty, pays one not half so high as is imposed on us for the manufacture of it; and, without giving more instances, the very garments we wear are colored in part by indigo, cultivated by the slave labor of India, admitted free here; though the garments are taxed high, and though it is an American production, and once considerably raised in the Southern States. Hence there is no indemnity for the other injuries of the protective system, by its employing or encouraging, in these ways, either American labor or capital; but, on the contrary, a direct discrimination in favor of the pauper labor all the world over, to the injury of all American labor at all competing with it, or which might compete with it, if protected by as high a duty as is imposed on the manufactures from it. And why not shield our labor in one case as fully as in the other; and by a like duty, if any of it is evoted or would then be to such productions? And if the farmer (not now financier) of Andalusia should ask for more protection for his pine apples and grapes, could he not defend the prayer in aid of his American labor and capital, quite as plausibly as some parts of the present system are defended?

To show in other respects how little averse its friends are to the use of foreign labor and foreign products, when useful to them, and that entirely free, let me refer the Senate to thirty or forty such articles in the act of 1842—a list of most of which is appended to table No. 4.

The only escape from all this is a mere question of dollars and cents in profit and loss by manufactures over other pursuits; and not the plausible but exploded one, that they are more American, and therefore more patriotic. But as to those greater gains, we have already attempted to explain how, in the long run, the species of manufactures raised up by high protection has not been durably productive of large profits to the whole engaged in them, or of advantage to the community as a whole.

If the restrictive system, then, employs no more American labor and capital than would be employed in other pursuits and in profitable manufactures here without it; if it uses foreign labor and foreign products whenever more beneficial to the manufacturers themselves; if, in fine, it yields no greater profits to the whole country, as a whole, no greater ability and prosperity than without it,—I entreat gentlemen to point out how it is more patriotic, or useful than other pursuits, so as to produce those great advantages, in a general point of view, which are supposed by some to counterbalance the many evils already explained. The only specific position left in their favor, unexamined, is that they tend to make us independent, as a nation, of other countries. It is not independence in producing instruments and munitions of war, and for national defence, as many erroneously suppose; since those we have long made for ourselves, and the duties, high or low, are of little consequence; but it is independence for the necessities and comforts, as well as some of the luxuries of everyday and peaceful life. Yes, sir, this kind of independence is gravely urged as momentous to the nation, and for other classes, when the manufacturers themselves go to foreign countries for all their raw materials, dyes, and machinery, when obtained there cheaper; when they are dependent—and it is a part of their system to remain dependent on foreign countries for much of their hides, hemp, cheap wool, indigo, and hundreds of other articles, because they obtain them at lower prices there. Can gentlemen forget that this is an admission of all we contend for, which is to be dependent on other countries for manufactures themselves, no less than other articles, when we can obtain them there cheaper, and only then?

On this principle we only ask leave to amend this partial system, so that we may go for fine cottons and woollens to England and France, where long experience and skill, and great capital, enable them to make such articles cheaper than here, and where improvements, too, are rapid and great. So when dependence here between different classes and pursuits is commended by eloquent arguments in favor of diversity of pursuits and sweet interchanges of industry, is it forgotten that, under our system, this variety and kindness would still remain to a useful extent, and be, by our commerce, diffused wider to all people? It is this mutual dependence among inhabitants of all nations, as well as of the same, which is the great nurse of commerce, and wealth, and civilization. It divides among them the surplus of each as well as all their arts and learning and other excellencies. It is the pathfinder, not only to mutual gain, but a purer religion and higher prosperity, and more durable peace the world over. Foreign nations thus become as dependent on us as we on them—not political dependence, which is often inadvertently confounded with this, but social and commercial and literary dependence, which is the best guarantee of progress in human affairs.

It is folly to suppose that we or any other nation can unite successfully within itself the productions and manufactures of all others—all climates, all stages of civilization; that we or England can raise as cheap and usefully the drugs of Turkey as Turkey herself, or the fruits of Spain, or wines of France; or they compete with England in making iron, or with us in raising cotton or pork, or making lead. And hence, while we ought not to become fanatics or visionaries, attempting to concentrate everything in one spot, (which alone

could be effected by Deity, but never yet, for wise reasons, has been done even by Him,) let us be content to buy all we need where it can without force be produced cheapest, whether at home or abroad; and sell all we do not need where it will bring most, whether at home or abroad. In this way, we shall follow out the apparent dictates of Providence, in giving advantages, in some things, to all climates and people, to be exchanged with others through the blessings of free commerce, and thus adopting the best apparent method of increasing our prosperity, and extending civilization, and securing peace throughout the world.

While all has changed, and is moving onward, are we to go back and cling to the dark restrictive systems of a ruder civilization—are we prepared to take the backward step, so as to protect, by discriminating duties, the old channels of commerce by the Euphrates and the isthmus of Suez, and again to build up Tyre, Alexandria, and Venice, rather than doubling the Cape of Good Hope? Are we to tax higher the use of steam in navigation, so as to encourage oars and sails?

By officious legislation, sir, are we to stop all improvement; and, while this new power in commerce is bringing all nearer, and making every people better acquainted with each other's wants and abundance, not only transferring St. Louis to Pittsburgh, and New Orleans to Charleston, but Europe as near as Halifax in days of yore, are we to counteract these new facilities for more intimate, enlarged, prosperous, and free trade, and while the Celestial empire itself is opening its ports under the progress of the age, virtually block all foreign ones up to us and ours forever, by a more stringent and restrictive policy on our part?

Much more must we beware of pushing this selfish system so as to operate not equally on one great people, but invidiously on sections and classes. Still more must we beware of such an unjust course among ourselves, and under our peculiar form of government, founded and to be sustained only on mutual concessions, mutual sacrifices and gains, and what should be durable and faithful compromises. Beware, sir, of seeking to escape from such compromises—though in technical legislation not forever binding—lest all amicable and honorary engagements become stripped of much of their moral force, and we seem puny in appearance, if not in reality. Beware, too, of a permanent return to that system which has once been abandoned for its perils to all held holy in our political brotherhood. Beware of tearing open, to fester anew and worse, old wounds that had been mostly healed, and which wrong is inflicted by the exercise of such doubtful powers as will justify the wildest schemes of internal improvement, for that general welfare which can be set up by the interested in defence of all extravagances, can justify distributions of the public treasures or public lands, and end in the assumption of two hundred millions of State debts. Beware of a policy, constitutional or otherwise, whose tendency is like that which, in the British corn laws, now agitates our parent country to its centre.

Above all, sir, let us, like the senator from Maine, read the injunctions of the farewell address of the father of his country against the causes of disunion, as well as disunion itself. Let him read and re-read the injunctions of that warning voice against the spirit of partiality and encroachment towards fraternal rights—against the inroads that fanaticism, or avarice,

or party, in the domineering spirit of powerful majorities, may be tempted to risk. Let him tell them to beware as to inconsiderate memorials here to dissolve that hallowed Union, on account of one of the compromises which led to it; and above all, to beware how petitions are encouraged which, under the distresses of war, formerly were confined to a faction, and died on their way hither; at the news of peace. Beware how such petitions are now encouraged to stalk into this very hall, from State legislatures, and urge us to unsettle the great compromises on which the Union itself rests, and which, if prostrated, may lead not only to separation, but scenes of border warfare, if not servile conflagration and carnage such as never before crimsoned the pages of history.

Tables referred to in Mr. Woodbury's speech.

TABLE NO. 1.

Several articles which pay a higher duty by the tariff of 1842 than that of 1828.

| Articles. | 1828. | 1842. |
|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Boots, silk - - | 30 cts. pr. pair. | 40 cts. pr. pair. |
| Coal— | 6 cts. pr. bush. | |
| at 28 bus. pr. ton | 1.48 } | |
| at 25 nct | 1.30 } | \$1 50 |
| Cordage, tarred - | 4 cts. pr. lb. | 4½ cts. pr. lb. |
| *Cottons - | 80 pr. cent. | 100 pr. cent. |
| | { 3½ cents | 4 cts. pr. sq. yd |
| Cotton-bagging - | { pr. square } | and 5 if gunny cloth. |
| | { yard. } | |
| Cotton laces - | 12½ pr. cent. | 20 pr. cent. |
| Glass, some kinds - | 400 pr. cent. | 500 or more. |
| Glass bottles - | \$2 to 3 pr. doz. | \$2½ to 4. |
| Molasses - | 5 cents pr. gal. | 5½ on weight. |
| Saddlery - | 25 pr. cent. | 30 pr. cent. |
| Shoes, some - | 25 cts. pr. pair. | 30 pr. cent. |
| Silks, some - | 20 pr. cent. | 30 to 60 pr. ct. |
| Steel, pr. cwt. | \$1 50 | \$2 50 |
| Twine - | 5 cents pr. lb. | 6 pr. lb. |
| Ware, crockery - | 20 pr. cent. | 30 pr. cent. |
| Ware, japanned - | 25 pr. cent. | 30 pr. cent. |
| Woollens, some - | 50 pr. cent. | 40 to 67 pr. ct. |
| Woollens, camlets - | 15 pr. cent. | 20 pr. cent. |

* On one kind of cottons, such as printed handkerchiefs, the duty is more than a hundred per cent. higher than in 1828; and many of the specific duties in this table would be much more above those in 1828, if reduced to a scale *ad valorem*.

TABLE NO. 1.—Continued.

Others which pay as high a duty by the act of 1842 as by that of 1828.

| Articles. | 1828. | 1842. |
|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Copperas - - | \$2 pr. cwt. | \$2 per cwt. |
| Clothing, made up - | 50 pr. cent. | 50 pr. cent. |
| Copper - | 4 cents per lb. | 4 cents per lb. |
| Glass, some kinds - | { 350 cents pr. } | { 350 cents pr. } |
| | { square foot. } | { square foot. } |
| | { soon falling } | |
| *Salt - - - | { to 10 cts. pr. } | { 8 cents } |
| | { bushel. } | |
| *Sugar - - - | 3 cents pr. lb. | 2½ cents pr. lb. |

* The specific duties in 1842, on these two articles, would be a higher per cent. on their value in 1842 than those were in 1828, as the value of the articles then was so much higher. Several other articles might be added which are in a similar situation.

TABLE No. 2.

Several articles in the tariff of 1842, which pay a higher duty than 30 per cent.—when specific, reduced to a scale ad valorem, at the Treasury Department, except when in brackets.

| | | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|--------------------|
| Boots, silk | - | - | 50 to 75 per cent. |
| Coal | - | - | 61 |
| Cordage | - | - | 71 to 188 |
| Cottons | - | - | 49 to 63 |
| *printed handkerchiefs | - | - | [132] |
| many others | - | - | [50 to 150] |
| Cotton bagging | - | - | 53 to 55 |
| gunny cloth | - | - | [100] |
| Clothing, made up | - | - | 40 and 50 |
| embroidered | - | - | 50 |
| Flour, wheat | - | - | 70 |
| Fruits | - | - | 50 |
| Glass, computed by merchants | - | - | [186 to 243] |
| Gloves, children's | - | - | 75 to 50 |
| kid | - | - | 60 |
| Hals | - | - | [35] |
| Hemp | - | - | [39] |
| Iron, † pig | - | - | 45 to 72 |
| scrap | - | - | 50 |
| bar | - | - | 85 |
| rolled | - | - | 77 |
| Leather | - | - | 53 |
| Lead | - | - | [100] |
| whiting | - | - | 146 |
| Linseed oil | - | - | [50] |
| Molasses | - | - | 51 |
| Oil-cloth | - | - | 67 |
| Opium | - | - | 75 |
| Pepper | - | - | 130 |
| Paper [97 by merchants] | - | - | 35 |
| Salt 80, [and Turk's island] | - | - | 144] |
| Silks | - | - | 40 to 65 |
| Shoes | - | - | 50 to 75 |
| Soap, soft | - | - | 50 |
| Sugar, brown | - | - | 71 |
| refined | - | - | 101 |
| syrup | - | - | [161 by merchants] |
| Spirits | - | - | 61 |
| Spices | - | - | [50 to 90] |
| Tobacco, in cigars | - | - | 40 |
| Wines | - | - | 60 to 67 |
| Woollens | - | - | 49 to 87 |

*Several articles pay so high a duty now, as to stop all imports of them; and hence the rate has to be computed otherwise than at the department, and on the values of 1840.

†See a schedule, computed on an English price current of Steward & Co.

‡Seventeen articles pay from 45 to 235 per cent. on their cost abroad. See table in memorial from New York. See annexed the articles and rate per cent. on the foreign cost.

| Articles. | Ad valorem rate of such duty. |
|---|-------------------------------|
| Anvils, Wilkinson's warranted | 70 per cent. |
| Brass battery or hammered kettles | 50 per cent. |
| But hinges, cast iron | 73½ per cent. |
| Hammers, blacksmiths' | 67 per cent. |
| Iron, in bars | 112½ per cent. |
| " under 5-8 inch square | 240 per cent. |
| Iron, sad or smoothing, tailors' and hatters' | 140 per cent. |
| Lion wire, No. 0 to 6 | 235 per cent. |
| " No. 14 | 230 per cent. |
| Iron wrought nails, rose-head, a bag of 100lbs., 8d. | 103 per cent. |
| Pins, mixed | 75 per cent. |
| Saws, cross-cut and pit | 75 per cent. |
| Screws, iron, called wood screws | 87 per cent. |
| Bright trace-chains, ½ feet, No. 3, iron | 144 per cent. |
| Kitchen furniture, such as saucepans, kettles, &c., lined | 45 per cent. |
| Bright ox and log chains | 160 per cent. |
| Jack chain | 96 per cent. |

TABLE No. 3.

Articles on which most of the duties are paid under the present tariff, estimated on imports* near the same as in 1840, in value.

| | | | |
|-------------------|---|---|-------------|
| Sugars yield near | - | - | \$3,500,000 |
| Silks† | - | - | 3,500,000 |
| Spirits | - | - | 2,000,000 |
| Woollens | - | - | 2,000,000 |
| Iron | - | - | 1,500,000 |
| " manufactures of | - | - | 500,000 |
| Cottons | - | - | 1,500,000 |
| Linens | - | - | 1,200,000 |
| Molasses | - | - | 1,000,000 |

Revenue paid by only 8 articles \$16,700,000

NOTE.—All are necessities, except spirits, and some kinds of silk; and all unfortunately happen to be rivalled here—even spirits.

* But imports were less in 1843 than in 1840; so that they did not yield over \$17,500,000.

† Must have declined, as silks are now taxed so much higher than in 1840.

TABLE No. 4.

Duties, discriminating for manufactures and against agriculture, &c.

| Agriculture and other raw material, low. | The manufactured materials, high. |
|--|------------------------------------|
| Hides,* 5 per cent. | Leather, 35 per cent. |
| Linseed, 5 per cent. | Linseed oil, 25 per cent. |
| Wool, cheap, 5 per cent. | Woollens, 28 to 60 per cent. |
| Cork, bark, free | Corks, made, 25 to 30 per cent. |
| Rags, for paper, 1 ct. per lb. | Paper, 15 to 17 cents per lb. |
| Quills, unprepared, 15 per ct. | Quills, prepared, 25 per cent. |
| Silk, raw, 50 cents per lb. | Silks, \$2 50, &c. |
| Bristles, 1 ct. per lb. | Brushes, 30 per cent. |
| Brass, crude, free | { Brass, manuf'd, 30 per cent. |
| | { " kettles, 12 cts. per lb. |
| | { Cordage, 100 to 130 per cent. |
| Hemp, 30 to 32 per cent. | { Cotton bagging, 50 to 80 p. ct. |
| Cotton, 3 cts., or 33 to 25 per ct. | { Cotton cloths, 80 to 120 per ct. |
| Flax, raw, 1 ct. or 7 to 9 per ct. | Flax, manuf'd, 25 to 50 per ct. |
| Lead, crude, 1½ to 3 cts. per lb. | { Lead, pipes, &c., 4 cts. p. lb. |
| | { " white & red, 4 cts. " |
| Tin, crude, in pigs, 1 per cent. | Tin, in plates, 2½ per cent. |
| Wood, rough, 20 per cent. | Wood, manufac'd, 30 per cent. |

*\$4,118,000 were the imports of only three articles out of the fifteen, in 1840—viz:

| | | | |
|----------------------------|---|---|-------------|
| Hides | - | - | \$2,756,214 |
| Cheap wool (under 8 cents) | - | - | 675,009 |
| Hemp (all kinds) | - | - | 666,777 |

\$4,118,000

List of articles free, and connected with manufactures:

| | |
|---|------------------------------|
| Models of machinery. | |
| Berries, | } used principally in dying. |
| Nuts, and | |
| Vegetables, | |
| All dye woods in sticks. | |
| Barilla. | |
| Bark of the cork tree, unmanufactured. | |
| Bells, or bell metal, old and only fit to be remanufactured. | |
| Brass in pigs or bars, and old brass only fit to be remanufactured. | |
| Brazil wood. | |
| Crude brimstone. | |
| Burr stones, unwrought. | |
| Clay, unwrought. | |
| Cochineal. | |
| Old copper, fit only to be remanufactured. | |
| India rubber, in bottles, or sheets, or otherwise unmanufactured. | |
| Old junk and oakum. | |
| Kelp. | |

Madder and madder root.
 Mother of pearl.
 Nickel.
 Palm leaf, unmanufactured.
 Pewter, when old and only fit to be remanufactured.
 Platina, unmanufactured.
 Ivory, unmanufactured.
 Plaster of Paris, unground.
 Rattans and reeds, unmanufactured.
 Saltpetre, when crude.
 Stones, called polishing stones.
 Stones, called rotten stone.
 Sumac.
 Tartar, when crude.
 Woods of all kinds, unmanufactured, not herein enumerated.

TABLE No. 5.

A list of agricultural articles, on which higher duties are imposed; but which are not raw materials for manufactures here, and are not rivalled abroad so as to be imported much, or to need any protection here.

| Articles. | Duty by act of 1842. | Value imported in 1840. |
|-------------|----------------------|-------------------------|
| Beef | 2 cts. per lb. | \$12,432 |
| Pork | 2 " " | |
| Bacon | 3 " " | 14,087 |
| Hams | 3 " " | |
| Cheese | 9 " " | |
| Butter | 5 " " | 23,229 |
| Lard | 3 " " | 3,763 |
| Wheat flour | 70 cts. per cwt. | 430 |
| Indian meal | 20 cts. per cwt. | 00 |
| Potatoes | 10 cts. per bushel | 16,960 |
| Wheat | 25 cts. per bushel | 639 |
| | | \$71,547 |

TABLE No. 6.

Rate of duties before the war of 1812, and the act of 1816.

| First act in 1790. | Raised in the same year, and in 1792, 1794, 1797, &c. so as to be, from 1805 to 1812, |
|---|---|
| Coal 2 cts per bush. | 5 cts. per bush. |
| Coffee 2½ cts. per lb. | 5 cts. lb. |
| Cordage (tarred) ¼ of a ct. per lb. | 2 cts. per lb. |
| Clothing, made, 7½ per ct. | 10 per ct. |
| Cottons 5 per ct. | 15 & 2½ |
| Glass 10 per ct. | 150 pr foot (window) |
| Hemp 60 cts. per cwt. | 100 per cwt. |
| Iron, rolled, 7½ per ct. | 15 & 2½ |
| steel ½ ct. per lb | |
| nails 1 ct. | |
| Molasses 2½ cts. per gal. | 4½ |
| Salt 6 cts. per lb. | free after 1807 |
| *Sugar, brown, 1 ct. per lb. | 2½ |
| Shoes, leather, 7 cts. per pair | 15 |
| Silks 5 per ct. | 15 |
| Teas per lb. 6 to 20 cts. | 12 to 40 |
| Ware, crockery, 10 per ct. | 15 & 2½ |
| Woolens 5 per ct. | 15 & 2½ |
| Articles not enumerated in the act, 5 per ct. | 7½ |

*The specific duties on sugar, molasses, salt, &c., were much less when computed *ad valorem*, than like duties would be now, as the prices of the articles are much lower.

TABLE No. 7.

Prices of several manufactured articles and others connected with manufactures in England.

| Years. | Salt, per bushel. | Hats, each. | Saltpetre, cwt. | Logwood, per ton. | Cochineal, cwt. | Pearl ashes, cwt. |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | s. d. | s. d. | s. d. | s. d. | s. d. | s. d. |
| 1795 | 5 0 | 2 8 | 135 0 | 11 0 | 12 0 | 66 0 |
| 1806 | 6 4 | 3 0 | 63 0 | 20 0 | 26 0 | 51 0 |
| 1821 | 19 4 | 3 0 | 27 0 | 6 10 | 24 0 | 27 0 |
| 1824 | 4 9 | 3 0 | 21 6 | 9 0 | 16 0 | 31 0 |
| 1836 | 1 3 | 3 0 | 24 6 | 6 0 | 7 6 | 25 0 |
| 1836 | - | - | - | 5 0 | 7 0 | 35 0 |
| 1838 | - | - | 21 0 | 7 0 | 6 4 | 25 0 |
| (^c) | (^t) | (^t) | (^s) | (^t) | (^t) | |

*See 2 Tooke, 397; and 2 McCulloch's Dictionary, p. 350.

†Salt is free, and has naturally fallen.

‡On a high duty, and risen.

§Under a lower duty, and fallen much.

¶Fallen under a low duty.

‡Fallen under a low duty.

TABLE No. 8.

Prices of several agricultural products, with tea, coffee, and spices, in England.

| Years. | Cheese, per lb. | Butter, per lb. | Beef, per tierce. | Flour, per sack. | Coffee, cwt. | Tea, Hyson, per lb. | Spices, per lb. |
|--------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| | d. | d. | s. d. | s. d. | s. d. | s. d. | s. d. |
| 1795 | 5½ | 8½ | 92 | 3 5 | 72 a 95 | 4 6 | 11 0 |
| 1806 | 7½ | 11½ | 135 | 4 2 | 115 a 143 | 4 8 | 4 9 |
| 1821 | 6 | 8½ | 120 | 2 5 | 106 a 125 | 5 5 | 8 6 |
| 1824 | 4½ | 8½ | 90 | 2 6 | 60 a 73 | 3 8 | 6 7 |
| 1836 | 4 | 7½ | 100 | 1 11 | 56 a 81 | 3 2 | 8 0 |
| 1836 | - | 10 | 107 | - | 80 a 96 | 2 2 | 7 8 |
| 1838 | - | 8½ | 112 | - | 63 a 81 | 2 3 | 6 6 |
| | (^c) | (^t) | (^t) | | (^t) | | (^s) |

*High duty, and higher price.

†High duty, and higher price.

‡Duty lower, and fallen.

§Duty lower, and some fall.

TABLE No. 10.

Wholesale prices at New York for a series of years.

| Years. | Salt, per bushel. | Sugar, per lb. | Coffee, per pound. | Tea, per lb. | Molasses, per gall. |
|--------|-------------------|----------------|--------------------|--------------|---------------------|
| | | | | | |
| 1806 | - | - | 31 | - | - |
| 1811 | - | - | 21 | - | - |
| 1815 | 80 a 65 | 15 a 17 | 24 a 27 | 1 25 a 1 50 | 60 a 75 |
| 1825 | 41 a 45 | 9 a 12 | 11 a 17 a 21 | 30 a 1 35 | 24 a 30 |
| 1830 | 39 a 42 | 7 a 10 | 11 a 13 | 30 a 1 30 | 27 |
| 1824 | 31 a 36 | 7 a 9 | 10 a 13 | 13 a 1 00 | 22 a 31 |
| 1836 | 30 a 33 | 10 a 13 | 11 a 14 | 18 a 1 10 | 36 a 40 |
| 1844 | 22 a 27 | 6 a 7 | 5½ a 11 | 20 a 90 | 25 a 30 |

No. 10—continued.

| Years. | Logwood, per ton. | Hides, per lb. | Rags, per lb. | Copper, per lb. | Lead, per lb. | Coal, per ton. |
|--------|-------------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|
| | | | | | | |
| 1806 | - | - | - | - | - | Dollars. |
| 1811 | - | - | - | - | 14 | 20 a 22 |
| 1815 | 35 a 40 | 13 a 14 | 6 a 10 | - | 9 a 11 | |
| 1825 | 22 a 26 | 12 a 14 | 7 a 10 | 16 a 26 | 7½ a 8 | |
| 1830 | 23 a 28 | 11 a 15 | 3 a 5 | 16 a 22 | 15 a 5 | |
| 1834 | 15 a 25 | 12 a 13 | 2 a 8 | 16 a 26 | 15 a 6 | 7 a 12 |
| 1836 | 15 a 27 | 9 a 14 | 6 a 8 | 19 a 25 | - | 8 a 12 |
| 1844 | 16 a 27 | 9 a 12 | 1 a 7 | 16 a 23 | 3½ a 4½ | 8 a 8½ |

No. 10—continued.

| Years. | Iron. | | | |
|--------|---------------|---------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| | Pig, per ton. | Bar, per ton. | Rolled, per ton. | Nails and sheet, per lb. |
| 1806 | - | - | - | - |
| 1811 | - | \$120 | - | - |
| 1815 | \$50 a \$55 | 105 a \$115 | \$90 a \$120 | - |
| 1825 | 35 a 50 | 70 a 75 | 100 a 110 | 6 a 8 |
| 1830 | 40 a 50 | 80 a 85 | 72 a 75 | 6 a 8 |
| 1834 | 33 a 45 | 72 a 75 | 75 | 6 a |
| 1836 | 40 a 45 | 75 a 90 | 80 a 85 | 6 a |
| 1844 | 25 a 34 | 70 a 100 | 57 a 70 | 11 a 12 |

No. 10—continued.

| Years. | Plaster of Paris, per ton. | Beef, per bbl. | Pork, per bbl. | Butter, per pound. |
|--------|----------------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|
| 1806 | - | \$10 | - | - |
| 1811 | \$30 | 10 50 | \$22 | - |
| 1815 | 10 50 | 12 50 a \$14 | 20 | 20 a 23 |
| 1825 | 5 25 | 7 50 | 10 50 | 8 a 16 |
| 1830 | 4 | 5 50 | 9 25 | 12 a 16 |
| 1834 | 3 | 5 75 a 6 | 9 50 a \$10 50 | 12 a 16 |
| 1836 | 4 | 9 75 a 10 25 | 17 50 a 18 | 20 a 25 |
| 1844 | 2 25 | 4 a 4 75 | 7 a 7 75 | 8 a 12 |

No. 10—continued.

| Years. | Cheese, per pound. | Northern corn, per bushel. | Wheat, per bushel. | Flour, per bbl. |
|--------|--------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| 1806 | - | \$1 25 | - | \$13 |
| 1811 | - | 1 15 | \$1 25 | 7 50 |
| 1815 | 11 | 1 12 | 1 75 | 8 50 |
| 1825 | 5 a 7 | 42 a 53 | 1 | 5 25 |
| 1830 | 6 a 8 | 52 a 53 | 80 | 5 |
| 1834 | 7 a 9 | 60 | - | 4 75 a \$5 |
| 1836 | 6 a 9 | 53 a 85 | 1 75 | 7 a 8 |
| 1844 | 4 a 5 a 5 1/2 | 47 a 48 | 1 a \$1 10 | 4 75 c 5 75 |

No. 10—continued.

| Years. | Common wool, per pound. | Flax, per pound. | Hemp, per ton. | Cotton, per lb. |
|--------|-------------------------|------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| 1806 | - | - | - | 25 |
| 1811 | - | - | \$300 | 21 |
| 1815 | 50 a 60 | 11 a 12 | 300 | 20 |
| 1825 | 30 a 35 | - | 155 a \$170 | 20 |
| 1830 | 16 a 22 | 8 | 210 | 11 |
| 1834 | 30 a 35 | 9 a 11 | 150 a 175 | 10 a 13 |
| 1836 | 35 a 40 | 8 a 11 | 170 a 200 | 9 a 20 |
| 1844 | 27 a 29 | 8 a 11 | 127 a 180 | 8 a 10 |

TABLE No. 11.

Wholesale prices at New York of the following articles:

| Years. | Cordage, per pound. | Duck, per bolt. | Cotton-bagging, per yard. |
|--------|---------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
| 1805 | - | - | - |
| 1811 | - | - | - |
| 1815 | 12 | 15 a 28 | - |
| 1825 | 7 1/2 | 6 1/2 a 18 1/2 | 17 a 21 |
| 1830 | 9 1/2 a 10 1/2 | 10 a 18 | 13 a 21 |
| 1834 | 9 1/2 a 10 | 11 a 17 | 17 a 21 |
| 1836 | 8 a 10 | 11 a 16 | 15 a 22 |
| 1844 | 11 a 12 | 7 1/2 a 17 | 13 a 18 |

No. 11—continued.

| Years. | Shirtings, per yard. | Calicoes, per yard. | Leather, per lb. | Lumber, pr. 1000 feet. |
|--------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------|------------------------|
| 1805 | - | - | - | - |
| 1811 | - | - | - | - |
| 1815 | - | - | 22 a 28 | 23 |
| 1825 | 11 a 15 | 15 | 22 a 28 | 15 |
| 1830 | 8 a 11 | - | 18 a 25 | 13 a 15 |
| 1834 | 6 a 9 | 9 a 20 | 16 a 27 | 17 a 18 |
| 1836 | 10 a 12 | - | 14 a 24 | 17 a 18 |
| 1844 | 5 a 8 | 6 a 8 | 14 a 19 | 10 a 11 |

TABLE No. 13.

| Year. | To England and her dependencies. | To all the world. |
|-------|----------------------------------|-------------------|
|-------|----------------------------------|-------------------|

All domestic exports.

| | | |
|------|--------------|--------------|
| 1822 | \$30,041,337 | \$49,874,079 |
| 1832 | 37,268,556 | 63,137,470 |
| 1842 | 52,306,650 | 92,969,996 |

Cotton.

| | | |
|------|------------|------------|
| 1822 | 16,250,253 | 24,035,058 |
| 1832 | 22,496,346 | 31,724,682 |
| 1842 | 30,135,412 | 47,593,464 |

Breadstuffs.

| | | |
|------|-----------|-----------|
| 1822 | 1,760,703 | 6,263,237 |
| 1832 | 2,386,829 | 5,583,990 |
| 1842 | 6,750,632 | 9,888,176 |

Tobacco.

| | | |
|------|-----------|--------------|
| 1822 | 2,860,173 | 6,222,892 |
| 1832 | 2,516,073 | 5,999,799 |
| 1841 | 5,849,581 | { 12,576,703 |
| 1842 | 3,624,945 | { 9,540,755 |

Beef and Cattle.

| | | |
|------|---------|-----------|
| 1822 | 271,796 | 844,534 |
| 1832 | 414,454 | 774,087 |
| 1842 | 540,710 | 1,212,638 |

Butter and Cheese.

| | | |
|------|---------|---------|
| 1822 | 41,017 | 221,041 |
| 1832 | 109,319 | 290,820 |
| 1842 | 245,286 | 388,183 |

Pork, Lard, &c.

| | | |
|------|-----------|-----------|
| 1822 | 135,315 | 1,357,899 |
| 1832 | 628,583 | 1,928,196 |
| 1842 | 1,219,994 | 2,629,408 |

Sperm Oil.

| | | |
|------|---------|-----------|
| 1822 | - | 8,972 |
| 1832 | 2,457 | 38,164 |
| 1841 | 251,431 | { 343,300 |
| 1842 | 140,204 | { 233,114 |

Lead.

| | | |
|------|--------|---------|
| 1822 | - | 3,098 |
| 1832 | 22 | 4,483 |
| 1842 | 90,888 | 523,428 |

Naval Stores—Tar, Rosin, and Turpentine.

| | | |
|------|---------|---------|
| 1822 | 434,733 | 457,562 |
| 1832 | 435,425 | 476,291 |
| 1842 | 616,478 | 742,329 |

Timber and Lumber.

| | | |
|------|---------|-----------|
| 1822 | 542,874 | 1,657,401 |
| 1832 | 708,576 | 2,149,651 |
| 1842 | 784,754 | 3,230,023 |

TABLE No. 9.

| Date. | Beef, per bbl. | Flour, per bbl. | Northern In- dian corn, per bushel. | Rice, per cwt. | Cotton, per lb. | Tobacco, per cwt. | Coffee, per lb. | Tea, per lb. | Sugar, per lb. | Molasses per Gall. |
|-------|----------------------|--------------------|---|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| 1795 | \$15 00 [†] | \$18 00 | \$12 00 | \$1 00 | 33 cts. | \$6 00 | 21 cts. | \$1 33 | 14 cts. | 60 cts. |
| 1800 | 8 00 | 17 00 | 10 00 | 75 | 40 | 5 00 | 25 | 1 34 | 14 | 48 |
| 1805 | 10 00 | 16 50 | 13 00 | 1 25 | 25 | 8 00 | 31 | 1 30 | 14½ | 48 |
| 1810 | 10 00 | 19 00 | 8 25 | 1 15 | 16 | 8 00 | 24 | 1 00 | 12½ | 40 |
| 1815 | 12 50 | 25 00 | 9 25 | 1 00 | 20 | 7 00 | 23 | 1 75 | 16 | 75 |
| 1820 | 10 00 | 14 50 | 5 37 | 60 | 16 | 7 00 | 26 | 1 00 | 10 | 34 |
| 1825 | 7 50 | 14 00 | 5 37 | 53 | 20 | 10 00 | 18 | 95 | 11 | 28 |
| 1830 | 7 75 | 12 00 | 5 00 | 55 | 11 | 6 00 | 12 | 90 | 9½ | 25 |
| 1834* | 8 50 | 12 00 | 5 50 | 66 | 12½ | 7 00 | 12 | 70 | 10½ | 34 |
| 1844 | 4 33½ | 7 25 | 4 81 to 5 62 | 47 | 8 to 10 | 3 00 to 6 00 | 7 to 5 | 25 to 40 | 6¼ to 8 | 25 to 31 |

TABLE No. 15.

Number of entries from abroad of American and foreign vessels during 1842.

| | No. of American vessels. | No. of foreign vessels. |
|---|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| From all foreign ports, exclusive of British North American | 4259 | 916 |
| Great Britain and Ireland | 614 | 373 |

Prices of leading domestic and foreign articles of produce at Boston for a series of years.

| | | |
|---|------|-----|
| Spain and Spanish colonies† | 1500 | 82 |
| France and French colonies | 406 | 74 |
| Hayti | 194 | 3 |
| Kingdom of the Netherlands and its colonies | 178 | 19 |
| Brazil | 176 | 26 |
| Denmark and Danish colonies | 144 | 23 |
| Mexico | 109 | 13 |
| The Pacific ocean | 127 | |
| Texas | 96 | |
| Venezuela | 86 | 23 |
| Naples and Sicily | 69 | 19 |
| The Atlantic ocean | 56 | |
| Buenos Ayres | 49 | |
| Portugal and Portuguese colonies | 44 | 7 |
| Hanse Towns | 43 | 112 |
| Africa | 41 | |
| Belgium | 35 | 20 |
| Russia | 28 | 12 |
| China | 26 | |
| Sweden | 23 | 47 |
| Turkey | 20 | |
| Italy | 17 | 3 |
| Trieste and Austrian ports | 15 | 1 |
| Central America | 14 | |
| New Grenada | 14 | 4 |
| Asia, generally | 10 | |
| Prussia | 2 | |
| Sandwich islands | 2 | |
| Sardinia | 1 | 1 |
| Peru | 1 | |

* The British colonies are peculiar in the laws, and in the frequent entries with passengers, &c., and are omitted in the table. They are 2,585 American, and 3,639 British.

† Near two-thirds of these are from Cuba.

TABLE No. 14.
Old and New English Tariffs.*

| Old. | £ | s. | d. | New—lower. | £ | s. | d. |
|------------------|---|----|------|-------------------------------|---|----|----|
| Cables | - | 10 | 0 | 6 0 cwt. | | | |
| Cider | - | 21 | 10 0 | 10 10 0 ton. | | | |
| Cotton, (cwt.) | 2 | 3 | 11 | Same as only 7½ per lb. | | | |
| Coffee | - | 1 | 3 | 6 lb. | | | |
| Cordage | - | 10 | 9 | 6 | | | |
| Bacon | - | 1 | 8 0 | 14 0 cwt. | | | |
| Beef | - | 12 | 0 | 8 0 do | | | |
| Hay | - | 1 | 4 0 | 16 0 load. | | | |
| Hemp | - | 4 | 15 0 | 4 0 cwt. | | | |
| Hides | - | 4 | 8 | 6 | | | |
| Lard | - | 8 | 0 | 2 0 cwt. | | | |
| Lead | - | 2 | 0 0 | 1 0 0 pig, and sheet per ton. | | | |
| Leather, (up.) | 1 | 10 | 0 | 12 0 | | | |
| Pork | - | 12 | 0 | 8 0 cwt. | | | |
| Potatoes | - | 2 | 0 | 2 cwt. | | | |
| Rice | - | 15 | 0 | 6 0 not rough. | | | |
| Soap | - | 4 | 10 0 | 1 10 0 | | | |
| Tar | - | 15 | 0 | 2 6 barrel. | | | |
| Turpentine | - | 1 | 6 2 | 5 0 cwt. | | | |
| Wood and lumber, | | | | Reduced about one-half. | | | |
| Wheat,† | | | | | | | |

* The duties by both the old and new tariffs are lower in most cases on English colonial products of the same descriptions.

† The average 3s. when cost 71s. per quarter, for wheat; and about 32 per cent. at their ordinary prices under the sliding scale.—(British Almanac, 1843, p. 132.)

TABLE No. 16.

Table of population, capital, and income, connected with each branch of industry in the United States, in 1840

| Population by the census, as viewed by some. | Capital. | Income by the census, computed by Tucker. |
|--|----------|---|
| Agriculture, 3,687,904 | - | \$564,387,597 |
| Manufactures, 554,168 | - | 239,836,224 |
| Trades, 237,581 | - | |
| Navigation, commerce, and fisheries, 206,604 | - | 91,717,094 |
| Mines, forests, &c. 92,507 | - | 59,293,621 |
| Aggregate, 4,798,769 | - | \$1,015,134,736 |
| | | By the Com. on Man. in Sen., 1842. |
| Agriculture | - | \$1,252,692,223 |
| Manufactures | - | 457,875,238 |
| Commerce (fisheries alone) | - | 15,204,142 |
| Mining, forests, and professions (mines and forests) | - | 69,927,130 |
| Omissions | - | 204,310,267 |
| *Aggregate | - | \$2,000,000,000 |

| By the census, apportioned and revised by me. | By the census as computed by me. | By myself. |
|---|----------------------------------|-----------------|
| Agriculture, 12,750,000 | \$3,900,000,000 | \$800,000,000 |
| Manufactures, and trades, 1,500,000 | 300,000,000 | 239,836,224 |
| Navigating, fisheries, &c., 1,250,000 | 380,000,000 | 100,000,000 |
| Mines, forests, &c. 1,500,000 | 320,000,000 | 80,000,000 |
| Aggregate, 17,000,000 | \$4,000,000,000 | \$1,219,836,224 |

*In France, the annual produce from her land is computed at \$632,231,812; in England, \$1,400,000,000; and from manufactures only about \$340,000,000.

†In apportioning the numbers of our whole population among the different pursuits in proportions, as indicated by the last

TABLE No. 17.

Proportion of capital and income in 1840 to each person connected with each branch of industry in the United States.

| Computed on the tables as revised by me. | Capital per head. | Income per head. |
|--|-------------------|------------------|
| Agriculture | \$235 00 | \$62 00 |
| Manufactures | 200 00 | 159 00 |
| Navigation and fisheries | 303 00 | 80 00 |
| Mines, forests, &c. | 213 00 | 53 00 |
| Aggregate and average* | 235 00 | 71 00 |

*The average income per head in the United States has before been estimated at fifty to one hundred dollars per head. The medium seventy-five dollars.—See Pitkin.

Professor Tucker makes the average eighty-four dollars in New England, to one hundred dollars elsewhere, and varies as confined to free persons or all the population.

In England, the average income is, from all sources, about one hundred dollars per head.—See Spackman's Statistical Tables, p. 160.

About the same to those connected with agriculture, and near one hundred and thirty dollars per head to those connected with manufacture.

TABLE No. 12.

Exports abroad.

| Date. | Pork and lard. | Beef, cattle, &c. cwt. | Butter & cheese, lb |
|-------|----------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| 1840 | \$1,800,000 | 600,000 | 200,000 |
| 1841 | 2,600,000 | 900,000 | 500,000 |
| 1842 | 2,100,000 | 1,200,000 | 3 to 400,000 |
| 1843* | 2,600,000 | 1,300,000 | 600,000 |

census, it is to be remembered that the census does not, as in England, return only those above twenty years of age devoted to each branch of business; but it includes usually, though not always, only the adult males employed in agriculture and commerce, while in manufactures it embraces women and children to the extent of more than one half of the whole number in some kinds.

*The last year is an estimate for one quarter, and actual returns for three quarters, to which I have had access.

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